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CHAPTER 1
UTILITARIANISM AND WAR
Introduction
Moral issues are a major part of our everyday lives, but for a member of the
military, they can take on whole new meanings. Whenever a person is handed a
weapon and trained to use it against another human being, that person needs to
understand and accept the ethical responsibilities placed on him/her and the
consequences that may result. One aspect of military service is the possibility for
participation in war and that war of any form is an act between persons and many
different consequences may occur from these acts to include killing. Some individuals
may argue that killing is wrong no matter w-hat circumstances are involved. However,
the WTongfulness of killing may not be absolute. This insight has led many
philosophers to question whether absolutist or utilitarian theories could be adapted to
help develop moral restrictions for conduct during times of peace and war. Some
philosophers have used utilitarian theories to determine whether killing may be justified
in certain extreme cases. Their attempts, as I will attempt to show, have not been very
successful.
Military conflicts are developed around specific goals. These may be near term
goals such as defending a sector, freeing friendly prisoners or more long term goals
such as liberating a country. Securing these goals must be accomplished within
guidelines and not performed according to the notion “success, no matter what the
consequences.” It is important for soldiers to know and understand the limitations on
their actions as required by rules and regulations. Different forms of education have
been used to instruct soldiers on proper conduct, but there may not be a perfect training
tool The United States Army has developed their Army value system as a simple
method to guide moral decisions, but there presently does not exist a moral military
decision making process. Some have suggested employing utilitarian theories to guide
the conduct of war. However, because of some weaknesses in utilitarianism, employing
utilitarian theories may be useful in education soldiers on “what not to do’' rather than
“what to do in certain cases. My concern is if utilitarian theories are true, a soldier’s
decision to act may be motivated by faulty reasoning and consequently cause immoral
outcomes. Richard Norman advocated a similar view by noting:
If utilitarian morality is concerned simply with doing good, w'ith
promoting as much well-being and relieving as much suffering as
possible, it may appear to justify using some people against their will in
order to do as much good as possible.'
It is this line of reasoning that leads me to contend that there is a weakness in certain
utilitarian as well as absolutist theories when used for educating military personnel in
appropriate decision making. I propose to develop and support a moral military7
decision making process by employing a combination of both absolutist and utilitarian
methods. After clarifying a few philosophical and military' terms used in this thesis, 1
will review three articles that propose various methods of developing rules of war.
These methods have weaknesses when reviewed individually, but may support a
decision making process when used in combination.
Utilitarianism
I would first like to clarify a few terms that will help explain some of the
2
statements and arguments in this paper. The first term I would like to address is
‘utilitarianism.’ This approach of morality dates back to the late seventeenth century
and has developed over the years with the work of philosophers such as John Stuart
Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick. Utilitarian theories tended to regard
pleasure and/or happiness as the single factor in human good Utilitarian theories also
considered the morality of actions as contingent on the consequences or results of the
actions. Today there are various forms of utilitarianism that emphasize particular and
sometimes contested aspects of utilitarian thought One of the best-known forms is
hedonic act-utilitarianism. Simply put, hedonic act-utilitarianism (HAU) declares that
an act is morally right if and only if it maximizes hedonic utility 2 This theory of
normative ethics of behavior requires some clarification.
On most occasions, an individual is presented with various alternatives to
choose to perform. Each one of these alternatives will generally cause different
consequences for the agent performing the act as well as others that may or may not be
affected by the act. The consequences produce measurable pleasures and pains that
help rank the acts to determine the best act to perform. HAU uses the notions of
“hedons," the unit of measure for pleasures, and “dolors," the unit of measure for pain,
to help rank the acts. Acts are assigned hedons and dolors according to the value of
pleasure and pain each act produces thus determining the overall utility of the act. An
individual presumably should then choose the act that produces the most utility.
According to utilitarianism, an individual is required to perform the act with the
greatest amount of utility; to not do so, violates utilitarian principles.
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For another view of HAU, Richard G. Henson provides some qualifications for
his view of hedonic utilitarianism:
( 1 ) At any given time, any given person is at some ‘hedonic level’ or
other, positive or negative or neutral—that is, either happy (in some
degree or other) or unhappy (in some degree or other).
(2) The range of possible hedonic levels forms (or approximates) a
continuum-one’s hedonic level can move up or down either
continuously or by very small increments.
(3) There is in principle some ‘hedonic metric’ such that the hedonic
state of a given person at a given time can be compared with any state of
himself at another time or with that of another person at any time.
(4) This hedonic metric is such that cardinal numbers (positive and
negative) can be assigned to hedonic levels.
(5) A hedonic arithmetic and calculus are thus possible: a person’s
‘hedonic sum’ can be (in principle) computed for any given period of
time and his ‘hedonic index’ (that is, average hedonic level) for that time
computed; and hedonic sums and indexes of groups of people can
similarly be determined. 3
These thoughts are what Henson considers the measurement of pleasure that would be
supported by the hedonistic utilitarian. These elements allow us to compare and
contrast acts on their outcome value. Henson does not look at these assumptions as
implying that an act is right if it “produces the greatest net pleasure” or produces “a
balance of happiness over unhappiness.” Rather, he views his theory as focusing on the
notion that “happiness is cardinal as true.”4 A problem occasionally occurs with the
concept of happiness which has caused difficulty among philosophers. Happiness is a
concept that is very difficult to define since it is interpreted differently by different
people. Because of this, happiness may be considered unmeasurable. It has been
argued that:
utilitarians commonly speak as if there were some entity, happiness, which
is in some respect homogeneous and in principle measurable, that the
different parts or constituents of happiness can somehow be reduced to a
single scale and weighted objectively and decisively against one another/
1
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It may be difficult to place a standard of measure on happiness even though it has been
attempted. It is not my intention here to argue for or against the notion of happiness
and how it fits on the hedonistic scale for utilitarianism. For my purposes, I will use the
before mentioned notion of hedons and dolors as a calculating means to aid in choosing
the best possible act to perform.
War
With the understanding of hedonic act-utilitarianism prescribed, I will now
focus on some terms that need to be defined to better interpret their military
application. The first term needing a definition is “war.” Unfortunately, this is not an
easy word to define. The problem has been suggested that “war cannot be defined
because it is so all pervasive, invades so many areas of human experience in so many
different ways, that it transcends the categories in which we seek to organize the world
and our experience of it.”6 With this in mind, can we ever determine what “war” is?
There have been various attempts to define the concept by examining animal analogies
believing that “the animal analogies reveal the human species as innately violent and
therefore naturally disposed to war.”
7
In order to focus on a specific area of war,
Paskins and Dockrill analyze war in terms of its military dimension:
The kind of fighting we have in mind has four characteristics:
(a) It is always likely to be fighting to the death, i.e. to the death
of individual human beings.
(b) The fighting, very likely to the death, that we have in mind is
fighting between groups organised for such fighting, or between such
organised groups and disorganised or unorganised opponents.
(c) The fighting we have in mind employs weapons designed for
the purpose.
(d) The fighting we have in mind is separable from quarrels over
matters relating to whatever the fundamental categories are in which the
5
people living in that world understand their social, political, religious
economic, etc., life.
The above passage indicates certain criteria are needed to claim an activity to be a
war as understood in their military dimension. So gang warfare, the war between the
sexes or class wars would not be classified as “wars” in this interpretation. The
decision for the United States to claim a hostile action a war requires more than the
above definition. The government of the United States must pass measures through
Congress to declare a hostile action a war as outlined in the Constitution of the United
States. The Vietnam conflict was never declared a war according to the requirements
of the Constitution. However, the Vietnam conflict could effectively be interpreted as
possessing the four characteristics of the military dimension of war. Vietnam veterans
of the conflict would possibly believe themselves to be “war” veterans despite the lack
of its classification as a war by the United States government.
U.S. Catholic Bishop View of War
A controversial discussion over warfare is whether or not a war can ever be
justified; however, the debate over just and unjust wars is beyond the argument of this
thesis. There are, however, several points that will support subsequent chapters of this
thesis. In 1983, the United States Catholic Bishops authored a letter discussing the
defense of peace from a just war tradition. The bishops outline their interpretation of
just-war theory in great detail, with an emphasis on the right to protection from
aggression but highlighting the restraints in waging war dictated by the standards of
proportionality and discrimination. The bishops did not deny the need for hostile
actions:
6
Certainly war has not been rooted out of human affairs. As long
as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and sufficiently
powerful authority at the international level, governments cannot be
denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful
settlement has been exhausted. Therefore, government authorities and
others who share public responsibility have the duty to protect the
welfare of the people entrusted to their care and to conduct such grave
matters soberly.
But it is one thing to undertake military action for the just
defense of the people, and something else again to seek the subjugation
of other nations. Nor does the possession of war potential make every
military or political use of it lawful. Neither does the mere fact that war
has unhappily begun mean that all is fair between the warring parties
.
9
According to this view it is permissible to defend oneself against aggression in order to
preserve freedom, but unacceptable to seek war against another as a means to
overthrow them. St. Augustine viewed war as “both the result of sin and a tragic
remedy for sin in the life of political societies. ' 10 Regardless of the reasons behind
conflicts, war seems inevitable according to the views of the bishops. Because of this
fact, they developed a list ofjus ad bellum criteria to ensure persons knew what made it
right to go to war against another people. A war would be considered “just” if the
conflict met the following criteria:
A. Just Cause
B. Competent Authority
C. Comparative Justice
D. Right Intention
E. Last Resort
F. Probability of Success
G. Proportionality
11
The key items that are relevant to this thesis are the criteria ofjust cause and
proportionality. I will explain these criteria individually.
7
Just Cause
The notion of the doctrine “just war” dates back to early Christian ethics and
was advocated by individuals such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. A
recurrent theme for a just war is the requirement of a just cause. St. Thomas Aquinas
stated one of his three conditions for war is that “a just cause is required, namely that
those who are attacked should deserve it on account of some fault.” 12 For the Bishops,
a just cause for war is viewed as acceptable when there is a need to confront an
undeniable and clear danger such as the need to safeguard innocent victims or protect
human rights. This is met with some opposition:
The difficulty at the present time is that there is consensus neither about
the content of the notion ofjust cause nor about its procedure. After
many years of deliberation, the United Nations has produced a kind of
definition ot aggression but one which lays down neither a workable
content nor a workable procedure whereby the justice of particular
causes can be determined: anyone can say that they are resisting
aggression, but there is inadequate agreement on what ‘aggression’ is. 13
This allows the interpretation of “just cause” to be open to infinite possibilities. The
United States has embarked on several military operations that they interpreted as just
causes. The invasion of Panama in 1989, which was entitled “Operation Just Cause,”
was aimed at preserving the conditions of cooperation that would be in the best interest
as discerned by the United States. Another goal was securing the arrest of Panama’s
dictator, General Manuel Noriega, since he was under indictment in the United States
federal courts system for trafficking drugs. After several threats against military and
civilian American citizens stationed in Panama, the President of the United States,
George Bush, believed to have a just cause to invade when he stated that:
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General Noriega’s reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in
Panama created an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in
Panama. As president, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the
lives of American citizens. 14
This invasion was never declared a war, but President Bush did offer four purposes for
ordering the invasion:
( 1 ) to capture Manuel Noriega and bring him to the United States to
stand trial in federal court;
(2) to protect U. S. citizens who were in danger;
(3) to maintain the integrity and neutrality of the Panama Canal; and
(4) to restore democracy to Panama. 15
These four goals of the invasion were deemed as sufficient to support the just cause
behind the invasion.
Proportionality
The second item of significance is proportionality. In today’s world, a conflict
in one part of the world ultimately can affect others in the international community.
With this in mind, the bishops maintain that “proportionality means that the damage to
be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected
by taking up arms.” 16 Regarding proportionality, Paul Ramsey writes:
It can never be right to resort to war, no matter how just the cause, unless
a proportionality can be established between military/political objectives
and their price, or unless one has reason to believe that in the end more
good will be done than undone or a greater measure of evil prevented.
But, of the tests forjudging whether to resort to or to participate in war,
this one balancing an evil or good effect against another is open to the
greatest uncertainty.
17
The notion of proportionality was advocated in 1972 by the International Committee of
the Red Cross during the second session of the Conference of Government Experts on
9
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts. They noted that proportionality was necessary as a means to protect
civilians in combat areas. The proposed provisions required the following:
Those who order or launch an attack, shall refrain from doing so when
the probable losses and destruction are disproportionate to the concrete
military advantage sought by them.
When there is a choice among several objectives for obtaining the same
military advantage, those who order or launch an attack shall choose the
objective which presents the least danger to the civilian population and
objects of a civilian character
.
18
Proportionality was a clear key factor in the nuclear arms dispute among various
countries. The use of nuclear weapons would cause such great devastation and
destruction, that some people did not see how their use could ever be proportional to
any means.
Combatants versus Non-Combatants
To help clarify the targets and goals of war, a distinction must be made between
combatants and non-combatants which will aid in determining whether an act of killing
involves innocent victims or culpable individuals. Jeffrie G. Murphy discusses this
distinction in his paper “The Killing of the Innocent.” Initially some may tend to define
a combatant as a soldier engaged in fighting. However, this definition may be too
narrow. Murphy states that:
If a combatant is understood solely as one who performs an action which
is a causally necessary condition for the waging of war, then the
following are going to be combatants: farmers, employees at a city
water works, and anyone who pays taxes . 19
The idea here is that farmers provide food for the soldiers, employees help provide
support for continuous city operations, and tax money is used to help fund the war
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effort. John Ford grants that even children,
buy war stamps, write letters of encouragement to their brothers in the
service, and even carry the dinner pail to the father who works in the
aircraft factory.
So are these persons considered combatants and thus open to possible targeting by
enemy forces'7 This problem makes it necessary to redefine “combatants.” A possible
new definition may be “those who are engaged in an attempt to destroy one another.”
The farmer, in virtue of being a farmer, may be causally connected to the destruction of
an enemy force, but is not necessarily engaged in the direct destruction of them.
Murphy puts it this way:
The farmer is aiding the soldier qua human being whereas the general is
aiding the soldier qua soldier or fighting man. And since your enemy is
the soldier qua soldier, and not qua human being, we have grounds for
letting the farmer off. If we think of a justified war as one of self-
defense, then we must ask the question ‘Who can be said to be attacking
us such that we need to defend ourselves against him?’ Viewed in this
way, the farmer seems an unlikely candidate for combat status. 21
This interpretation opens up some possible ambiguous cases. What about workers in
ammunition plants? They provide support for the war effort by producing ammunition
that will be used to kill enemy soldiers. The United States military has historically
marked these sites as potential targets as a means to hinder enemy resupply efforts. The
August, 1998 attack by the United States on chemical factories in Sudan was justified,
according to U.S. government officials, because they had evidence of chemical
ammunition production at the target sites. The Sudanese government claimed the
factories produced medical drugs and its destruction severely disrupted their supply. So
was the U.S. justified in this act? Murphy states the following in this case:
ll
I should hope that reasonable men would accept that the burden of proof
lies on those claiming that a particular group of persons are combatants
and properly vulnerable. I should hope that men would accept, along
with the famous principle in the criminal law, the principle
‘noncombatant until proven otherwise’ and would attempt to look at the
particular facts of each case as carefully and disinterestedly as possible.
I say that I hope this, not that I expect it . 22
The main goal of the U.S. attack was to destroy the production capability at the
factories as well as to minimize the loss of life. According to these goals, the attack
was successful in both respects since the production capability was destroyed and the
strike was conducted during the night hours when the number of personnel working
inside the factories was minimal.
From the previous examples, one may not be able to determine what the
distinction between combatant and noncombatant actually is. The following simple
definitions may also be insufficient:
(i) Combatants are those individuals whom one can reasonably
be convinced are engaged in an attempt at the destruction of another.
(ii) Noncombatants can be considered all those ofwhom it is not
reasonable to believe are engaged in this destruction.
This distinction between combatants and noncombatants is still crude and needs
refinement. In The Ethics of War
, Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill offer a better
proposal for the distinction:
It is one thing for a person to do something whose point relates to war,
but quite another thing for a person to be engaged in such activity as one
of those parts of life in which, if anywhere, the meaning of his life is to
be found. The purchase of the war stamps is merely an episode in the
child’s life, not an activity constitutive of whatever meaning the child’s
life contains. By contrast, work as a volunteer soldier or an unwilling
conscript is activity of the kind that confers meaning (or
meaninglessness) on a person’s life. Similarly, the activity of a guerrilla
or freedom fighter in their hours off work is the kind of thing that
confers meaning on a person’s life in a way that a child’s purchase of
12
war stamps does not.
In our use ot the word, therefore, ‘noncombatant’ has a rather
narrow meaning. A noncombatant is a person who is not a combatant,
and a combatant is a person who (i) is engaged in activity which has a
military dimension which (ii) is among the activities which confer, if
anything does, meaning on the person’s life . 23
The view of “meaning on the person’s life” is an interesting one and I believe holds
some significance. A person’s occupation does not always determine his or her
classification as a combatant or noncombatant. For example, during the Gulf War a
Saudi Arabian truck driver was considered a noncombatant according to the above
explanation by Paskins and Dockrill. However, a Saudi Arabian truck driver delivering
ammunition for allied forces was presumably considered a combatant. This could be
explained by the fact that his cargo of ammunition made him a possible target by enemy
forces, not because he was “engaged in combat, but because the meaning of his life
had taken on a new militant purpose of supporting a war effort. What if the cargo had
been food supplies for allied troops? The driver would then be considered a
noncombatant since he was supporting the troops, not as soldiers, but as human beings.
Thus, the meaning of one’s life may be a key aspect in the differentiation of combatants
and noncombatants.
Paul Christopher discusses this distinction in his book The Ethics of War &
Peace . He discusses the view of noncombatants as having the status of being innocent:
During wartime, combatants are those who are either directly or
indirectly involved in attacking one belligerent nation’s constituents on
behalf of another nation or political group. The term combatants refers
primarily to members of the armed forces, but can include certain
political leaders who are engaged in planning and carrying out the war
effort as well as civilians who are working on behalf of the military. . .
we will use the term combatant to refer to those opponents who can
justifiably be attacked in wartime, and the terms innocent and
13
noncombatant interchangeably to refer to all of those categories of
persons who are protected from attack under international law
.
24
His version of the distinction illustrates the need for international law which depicts
who is and who is not authorized to be targeted during military operations. Christopher
goes on to show how the status of individuals may change from combatant to
noncombatant and back again. He indicates how the position of a person can change
depending upon their status:
When a nation s soldiers act on behalf of their nation in carrying out
policies requiring the use of force, they may be defended against. Upon
capture or surrender, however, a soldier’s status as a combatant is
terminated, and he (or she) reverts to his (or her) former category as an
innocent.
. .This change in status from combatant to noncombatant can
occur either because of surrender, or capture, or because of injury
.
23
International law has rules governing the treatment of the injured and prisoners which
Christopher claims gives them the status of “innocent” individuals or noncombatants.
These international laws are developed to ensure the fair treatment of individuals
during conflicts, but the problem comes in enforcement of these laws. The United
Nations tries to work as an international governing body to control hostile actions, but
even their authority is limited
The UN was created to keep the peace, and its Members have agreed to
refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations. But
this does not mean that armed conflict has ceased . 26
Since war is inevitable, it is critical to understand the differentiation between
combatants and noncombatants, but how do we do this? It is difficult to say for every
situation a soldier faces is different and it is hoped through education and training that
soldiers will make correct decisions on what action to perform.
14
It is through education and training that members of the military will be able to
make informed decisions on what acts are permissible. Therefore, in the following
three chapters I will illustrate some theories that may aid in developing methods to help
this educational process. The theories have their individual strengths and weaknesses
for various reasons. I will discuss these and will offer a proposed method of employing
the theories as a moral military decision making process.
15
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CHAPTER 2
NAGEL'S ABSOLUTISM AND UTILITARIANISM
In his article, War and Massacre,” Thomas Nagel asserts that when the conduct
of war goes wrong, actions are usually defended on legal grounds and not moral
grounds. Nagel argues for the need to re-focus the conduct of war on a moral basis and
not primarily on a legal one. His concern is that even though there exists a moral basis
for the rules of war, it seems to be lacking any enforcement based on incidents that he
saw occurring in Vietnam
Means and Ends
Nagel s search lor a moral theory to guide the conduct of war is viewed by him
as a problem of means and ends. In order for a hostile act to be justified, the means
must be justified in the end result. Nagel uses the example of an incident that occurred
on 16 March, 1968 that came to be known as the My Lai Massacre. The incident
involved a United States Army unit engaged in a search and destroy mission against
suspected enemy Viet Cong forces in northeastern South Vietnam. The unit, led by
Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., entered the village of My Lai and proceeded to kill
350 Vietnamese including women and children without any form of provocation from
enemy forces. The incident was ignored for approximately eighteen months until it was
forced to be reviewed as a potential crime.
For a while, the massacre seemed shrouded in secrecy, but national and
international outrage forced the military to provide some details about it
and eventually to bring charges against Calley and fourteen other officers
and enlisted men . . . Calley’s sensational trial from November 1970
until March 29, 1971, focused public attention on both the horror of the
Vietnam War and the problem of guilt for war crimes.
1
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The major concern with this incident was that the United States' soldiers killed the
Vietnamese without any provocation or apparent reason. Those who pushed for
prosecution contended that despite having been given an order to kill by the higher
chain ol command, Calley and his unit did not necessarily have the right to decimate
the Vietnamese village. Nagel states “there are limits on what may be done even in the
service of an end worth pursuing-and even when adherence to the restriction may be
vety costly. ‘ So were Calley’s actions justifiable as a means to an end 17 Calley may
have believed he was acting in a proper way, given his orders and the circumstances at
hand, however his actions should have been questioned under moral considerations.
Nagel notes:
If he believes that the gams from a certain measure will clearly outweigh
its costs, yet still suspects that he ought not to adopt it, then he is in a
dilemma produced by the conflict between two disparate categories of
moral reason, categories that may be called utilitarian and absolutist. 5
This generates Nagel's principle argument for the disparity between utilitarian and
absolutist theories. This argument lays forth that the former gives focus to what will
happen where as the latter focuses on what one is doing.
Nagel believes this conflict arises out of the need to determine not only what
outcome is best, but whether the means necessary for the outcome will be permissible.
There may be some cases that require the use of inappropriate means in order to
produce the best outcome In these cases, Nagel would suggest that it is wTong to bring
about the outcome even though it may be the best one available. For Nagel, “when one
of the choices is to do terrible things to another person, the problem is altered
fundamentally: it is no longer merely a question of which outcome w'ould be worse
" 4
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He sees the need to review how the actions are carried out and not focus merely on the
probable consequences. For crisis situations, Nagel suggests, a moral dilemma may
occur when one must choose between what will happen and what one is doing. In some
cases every possible option may be inappropriate for one reason or another This
dilemma is the heart of his argument.
Straightforward Utilitarianism
Although the dilemma between the two theories is his main focus, Nagel
devotes the majority of his article to discussing its absolutist factor. According to him.
the utilitarian component is straightforward by comparison, and has a natural appeal to
anyone who is not a complete skeptic about ethics He holds the general view' that
one should maximize good and minimize evil:
Utilitarianism says that one should try, either individually or through
institutions, to maximize good and minimize evil (the definition of these
categories need not enter into these schematic formulation of the view),
and that if faced with the possibility of preventing a great evil by
producing a lesser, one should choose the lesser evil. 6
As he indicates, Nagel does not go into great detail over his definition of utilitarianism
since, according to him, it is essentially “straightforward.” Because Nagel offers this
vague definition of utilitarianism, he leaves himself open to debate This problem is
apparent when Nagel's utilitarian (NU) version is formulated as follows:
NU: An act is morally right if and only if it maximizes pleasure (good)
and minimizes pain (evil).
NU is not equivalent to the previously discussed HAU. For example, suppose SGT
Tom has three choices (al, a2, and a3) available to him at a certain time. The acts
themselves are not important to the example, the fact that the acts cause pleasures and
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pains does affect the example. Suppose the acts would produce the following amounts
of pleasures and pains:
Alternatives Pleasure Pain Hedonic Utility
al
:
a2:
a3:
1 00 hedons 99 dolors
90 hedons 10 dolors
1 0 hedons 9 dolors
+ 1
According to HAU, the only right act in this example is a2, since it maximizes utility at
80 compared to the other two acts. The problem is that a2 does not maximize
pleasure whereas al does. Neither does a2 minimize pain: a3 produces only 9 dolors,
whereas a2 produces 10. Thus, a2 does not satisfy either condition as stated in NU. It
produces neither more pleasure than its options, nor does it not produce less pain than
its options. Therefore, on the basis of NU, a2 would not be the right act to choose to
perform. According to the conditions in NU, no alternatives in this example would be
acceptable to perform The trouble with NU is the requirement to maximize two
independent variables. As this case depicts, it may not always be possible to maximize
pleasure and minimize pain for a particular action. Because of this, I believe Nagel is
being too broad in his interpretation of utilitarianism which tends to weaken his
argument. Despite this weakness he does identify some problems with utilitarian
theories:
.
despite the addition of various refinements, it continues to leave
large portions of ethics unaccounted for. I do not suggest that some form
of absolutism can account for them all, only that an examination of
absolutism will lead us to see the complexity, and perhaps incoherence,
of our moral ideas
*
Despite its shortcomings, Nagel believes utilitarianism can justify certain restrictions on
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the conduct of warfare, but absolutism holds a stronger argument for controlling actions
as will be demonstrated.
On the surface, there seem to be utilitarian reasons for observing the provisions
placed on actions in war. These provisions are those generally accepted by rational
individuals which include not annihilating a village to kill a few possible enemy
soldiers or employing nuclear weapons against a weak adversary. These approaches
may, in the long run, do more harm than good:
An exceptional measure which seems to be justified by its results in a
particular conflict may create a precedent with disastrous long-term
effects. It may even be argued that war involves violence on such a scale
that it is never justified on utilitarian grounds—the consequences of
refusing to go to war will never be as bad as the war itself would be.
even if atrocities were not committed.
'
Nagel believes that the dilemma between the theories will not always be resolved.
Because of this problem, he offers a “somewhat qualified defense of absolutism ;’ 10
that he believes will lead to a moral judgment that is unable to be reduced or overruled
by other principles. Nagel is quick to caution us that:
. . . while there may be other principles just as fundamental, it is
particularly important not to lose confidence in our absolutist intuitions,
for they are often the only barrier before the abyss of utilitarian
apologetics for large-scale murder
.
11
This seemingly negative view of utilitarianism leads us to Nagel’s absolutist position
What is Absolutism 9
Absolutism is a view that certain act-types are always wrong or always
obligatory at every time and every place no matter what the consequences and that
1
2
“there are nonoverrideable moral principles which ought never to be violated
"
" An
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example of a common absolute! belief would be that it is always WTong to kill innocent
Pe°Ple Absolutism may take several forms and one extreme form of absolutism is
pacifism: ‘-the view that one may not kill another person under any circumstances, no
matter what good would be achieved or evil averted thereby.” 13 A pacifist argument for
not participating in war has been formulated and suggested by Paskins and Dockrill:
1 Killing human beings is pnma facie wrong;
2. In doing, or preparing or threatening to do, something which is pnma
facie wrong one should be very sure what one is doine;
3. In taking part in war it is impossible to be sure what one is doing;
4. Therefore, one should not engage in war. u
Their argument is an attempt to defend pacifism, yet it is invalid since the conclusion is
not supported by the premises. Regardless, their attempt at a pacifist argument suggests
that a soldier may not know if he will ever kill another human being in war and.
therefore, any participation in acts of war would be wrong. Nagel believes pacifism
“creates no problem of interpretation (and it) draws the conflict with utilitarian
considerations very starkly.
A
utilitarian may say that one may participate in war if
participating maximizes utility' even if killing may be involved in the process. A
pacifist would have to disagree since killing is an aspect of war and any type of killing
is wrong. Participation in war is, therefore, not allowed. Pacifism may be an extreme
version of absolutism, but Nagel notes it is not the emphasis of his argument.
Nagel s focus is toward other forms of absolutism that allow violence as long as
it is for just causes and certain restrictions are followed. One restriction, he assumes,
requires an understanding of the difference between murder and acceptable killing in
warfare. One philosopher who has written about this is G. E. M Anscombe She noted
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that the policy of deliberately killing large numbers of civilians either as a means or as
an end in itself.
. . was common practice
6
Throughout history, nations have used
attacks on civilian populations as a means to attempt to bring conflicts to an end
Examples of this include incidents during World War II in March 1945 where U S.
officials targeted Japanese civilians in an effort to break down morale and thus collapse
the Japanese war effort:
In U S. firebomb raids, 330,000 Japanese civilians were burned
to death and 31 square miles of Japan’s most densely populated urban
neighborhoods were burned to the ground. More than 8 million civilians
fled.
Civilian morale plummeted, but because of fierce traditional
loyalty to the emperor that made no difference to the war effort. 17
Similar occurrences also happened in Germany during World War II:
In Germany, the study found the civilian economy ‘had a
surprising resiliency.’ The industrial city of Hamburg, for instance, was
virtually wrecked by Allied bombs in August 1943. But five months
later it had reached 80 percent of its prewar production level.
After four years of strategic bombing, Germany was ‘mortally
wounded, but the effects of the impending collapse ‘had not reached the
enemy's front lines when they were overrun by Allied forces.’ 18
These two examples indicate that targeting noncombatants as a means to end a conflict
have been utilized, however, they were not very successful in ending the conflicts.
Nagel views the practice this way:
It gives evidence of a moral conviction that the deliberate killing of
noncombatants-women, children, old people--is permissible if enough
can be gained by it. This follows from the more general position that
any means can in principle be justified if it leads to a sufficiently worthy
end .
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Nagel saw this happening in Vietnam with the use of antipersonnel weapons, napalm,
aerial bombardments, extensive relocation of civilians, etc Although these acts were
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sa,d to have unfortunate consequences, the act.ons were usually defended by military
officials as necessary to the long-term success or failure of the war. These “unfortunate
consequences are what Nagel believes absolutism can prevent.
Even though absolutism focuses on what one is doing, it does not obligate an
individual to ignore the consequences that may occur from performing an act. For
Nagel, absolutism “operates as a limitation on utilitarian reasoning, not as a substitute
for it
21
He believes that, just like utilitarians, absolutists can strive to maximize good
and minimize evil, as long as one does not have to violate an absolute restriction in the
process It a conflict occurs between the prohibition of an act and its consequences, the
prohibition takes priority over the consideration of the consequences. For Nagel:
It requires us to torgo certain potentially useful military measures, such
as the slaughter of hostages and prisoners or indiscriminate attempts to
reduce the enemy civilian population by starvation, epidemic infectious
diseases like anthrax and bubonic plague, or mass incineration. It means
that we cannot deliberate on whether such measures are justified by the
fact that they will avert still greater evils, for as intentional measures
they cannot be justified in terms of any consequences whatever.
Nagel had hoped utilitarian considerations would deter the use of such extreme
measures during conflicts, but events such as the My Lai incident proved this hope was
in vain. He noted that once the opportunity was available to those who calculate the
utility of national interest, the need for peace and freedom sometimes outweighed the
loss of innocent lives. This is where Nagel sees a weakness in absolutism, since it can
be viewed as permitting one to do horrible things to people in some circumstances but
not in others. " Here Nagel seems to be questioning his own view of absolutism and to
clarify this matter he sees the need to explain some concerns.
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Technical Matters
In order to ensure an understanding of Nagel's reasoning, he sees it necessary to
elucidate a few technical matters. The first matter is to clarify what actions absolutist
prohibitions can be applied to. It is ordinarily understood that killing involves the
taking of the life of another human being, and an absolutist position generally prohibits
bringing about the death of an innocent person. Unfortunately, soldiers are put into
situations where they may be faced with this very predicament.
Nagel is concerned with cases in which someone is destined to die, but who
actually dies depends upon what one does. For example, a medic may only have a
limited supply of life saving medicine for his unit. If too many soldiers require this
medicine to survive, some will eventually die because of the limited supply. Would the
medic, then, be at fault for these deaths 9 Nagel would have to say no, since the medic
did not cause their deaths for "not everything that happens to others as a result of what
one does is something that one has done to them ”2? The medic did not bring about the
resulting deaths by doing something to them. Catholic theology has attempted to
address this distinction through the doctrine known as the law of double effect.
The law of double effect attempts to make a distinction between intended and
unintended consequences. The expression pertains to the fact that actions may
sometimes have two sets of consequences, “one set being the intended consequences for
whose sake the action is performed, and the other set being unintended side-effects .”24
Military' targets are attacked as a means to kill combatants and defeat an enemy force
which is itself permissible. Unfortunately, a foreseeable but an unavoidable side-effect
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of the action is that a number of noncombatants living close by are apt to be killed It
would be wrong to deliberately cause the deaths of the noncombatants, but the law of
double effect would say the deaths were permissible as a side-effect of the act.
Nagel has his own assessment of double effect. He stresses the fact that even if
the result is predicted, the act is not necessarily murder and does not fall under the
absolutist prohibition. In applying this law to acts of war, it allows a limited amount of
noncombatant losses as a “side-effect" of hostility toward legitimate military targets.
However, Nagel has a problem with this theory:
despite its importance and its usefulness in accounting for certain
plausible moral judgments, I do not believe that the law' of double effect
is a generally applicable test for the consequences of an absolutist
position Its own application is not always clear, so that it introduces
uncertainty where there need not be uncertainty.
^
Because of this, Nagel prefers to remain with the simple distinction between what one
does to people and what merely occurs to them as a result of what one does.
Another technical matter has to do with a frequent criticism of absolutism.
Nagel shows it is “sometimes suggested that such prohibitions depend on a kind of
moral self-interest, a primary obligation to preserve one’s own moral purity no matter
what happens to the rest of the world. -< Nagel notes that absolutism is not the only
moral theory that suggests each person maintain their own moral purity. For
absolutism, he sees two distractions behind the belief that moral self-interest underlies
moral absolutism. The first suggests that there exists a need to preserve moral self-
interest as a source of an obligation. For if someone commits murder, he/she may
sacrifice moral purity only because murder is already wrong. The prevailing incentive
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against committing murder cannot be that it makes someone an immoral person. The
second distraction is the notion that “one might sacrifice one's moral integrity
justifiably, in the service of a sufficiently worthy end, is an incoherent notion.”27 If an
individual were justified in producing such a sacrifice, then one may not be sacrificing
moral integrity by embracing that procedure: one would be protecting it
Absolutist Restriction on Warfare
Nagel believes the absolutist restrictions on the conduct of war can be
categorized into two kinds:
1 Restrictions on the class of persons at whom aggression or violence
may be directed, and
2 Restrictions on the manner of attack, given that the object falls within
that class.
2K
These two categories may lead to a combined principle that reads a “hostile treatment
ol anv person must be justified in terms of something about that person which makes
the treatment appropriate. According to Nagel s theory, once individuals are able to
understand and control their hostility against certain persons as well as the means used
against them, we will be able to control the conduct of warfare.
Class of Persons
The targets of hostile actions are a key aspect in Nagel's theory. He presumes
that an individual does not stop considering someone else a person simply because they
start fighting between themselves. He goes on to say:
If hostile, aggressive, or combative treatment of others always violated
the condition that they be treated as human beings, it would be difficult
to make further distinctions on that score within the class of hostile
actions. That point of view, on the level of international relations, leads
to the position that if complete pacifism is not accepted, no holds need
be barred at all, and we may slaughter and massacre to our hearts'
28
content
.
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What I hope is that this is not how the average person views relationships between
humans and likewise relationships between nations as well. It seems to come down to
whether one fights clean or fights dirty. Fighting dirty usually means “to direct one’s
hostility or aggression not at its proper object, but at a peripheral target which may be
more vulnerable, and through which the proper object can be attacked indirectly .”31
Fighting dirty can be applied to many different acts to include running for office,
brawls, as well as to the conduct of individuals and nations engaged in war. What is
important to keeping a fight “clean " is to direct an attack at the true target of hostility,
and not at minor targets that happen to be susceptible.
An example of misdirected hostility can be examined in the following example.
A particular airline has limited catering services available due to budget constraints,
thus they no longer serve full meals to their passengers. A passenger on one of their
longer flights becomes upset about the mediocre snack he received instead of what he
expected to be a full meal. He commences to verbally abuse the flight attendants
through derogatory remarks about their gender, appearances, race, etc. Was it morally
wrong for him to direct his hostility at the attendants? Probably. The flight attendants
are simply doing their job by serving the food they have available. The disruptive
passenger would serve better moral ends by directing his hostility at the airline
corporation and not its flight attendants.
Cases of this sort may differ in seriousness to the extent where brutal physical
harm may be caused. Regardless, the same principle should be followed:
that hostility or aggression should be directed at its true object. This
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means both that it should be directed at the person or persons who
provoke it and that it should aim more specifically at what is provocative
about them. The second condition will determine what form the hostility'
may appropriately take . 32
Nagel asserts that it is obvious that the relationship between persons is essential to this
principle. He believes that any intentional action should be addressed between
individuals as a subject and an object:
whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him
as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject. It should
manifest an attitude to him rather than just to the situation, and he should
be able to recognize it and identify himself as its object . 33
He speaks that to treat someone as a “subject” is to treat them as a “person.” This sort
of terminology “clearly invokes Kant’s concept of ‘respect for persons’ and his
distinction between treating human beings as persons and treating them as mere otyects,
mere means to an end/" 4 Hostile military actions usually have this distinction defined
as allies and adversaries, but the scope of individual attitudes sometimes weakens the
view of the victim as a subject. Instead, the aggressive behavior “takes on the character
of purely bureaucratic operation This hapj^ens when an individual assaults someone
who is not the true object of the intended hostility.
The interpersonal relationships between subject and object appears to be an
important aspect of Nagel’s belief in absolutism:
If absolutism is to defend its claim to priority over considerations of
utility, it must hold that the maintenance of a direct interpersonal
response to the people one deals with is a requirement which no
advantages can justify one in abandoning. The requirement is absolute
only if it rules out any calculation of what would justify its violation .
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Nagel's claim of requiring “the maintenance of a direct interpersonal response to the
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people one deals with” is further explanation of the need for focusing military
operations on treating human beings as persons. He does note that there may be
extreme circumstances that would make an absolutist view unreasonable. This may be
the case when an indi vidual has no choice but to perform a terrible action Nagel notes
that “even in such cases absolutism retains its force in that one cannot claim
justification for the violation; it does not become all right.”37 Nagel’s explanation of
his reasoning is that he relates absolutist restrictions with the feasibility' of trying to
justify actions directly to the victim An example of this could be when a soldier
bayonets an enemy soldier and says, “It s either you or me! The soldier is attempting
to justify his action to the victim and might succeed in this context since bayoneting
another person is an interpersonal, face-to-face action Nagel doesn’t believe you can
say to Hiroshima victims, “You understand, we have to incinerate you to provide the
Japanese government with an incentive to surrender.”38 A utilitarian could possibly be
able to offer justification for the latter example if the utility of the act was satisfactory'.
Utilitarian justifications do not sit well with Nagel, for the utilitarian view
“ignores the possibility that to treat someone else horribly puts you in a special relation
to him, which may have to be defended in terms of other features of your relation to
him 7 But this requirement could place a tremendous amount of restraint on an
individual if it becomes necessary' to continuously justify each action to each individual
victim An illustration of this can be seen in a passage from All Quiet on the Western
Front
.
A soldier has just killed an enemy soldier who has stumbled into the shell-hole
where he was hiding. After watching the enemy soldier die, he went through his
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persona] effects and learned his victim's name and found photos of his family:
Comrade, I did not want to kill you But you were only an idea to me
before, an abstraction that lived in my mind and called forth its
appropriate response. It was that abstraction I stabbed. But now, for the
first time, I see you are a man like me... Forgive me, comrade; how
could you be my enemy?40
This is an example of Nagel s suggested notion of persons as being subjects and
objects. He believes this is important since “absolutism is associated with a view of
oneself as a small being interacting with others in a large world The justification it
requires are primarily interpersonal.”
41
The above example can be seen as an honest
exposition of how the soldier felt. At first the soldier was simply killing an “abstract”
iorm. It was not until he .saw the soldier as a human being, or “subject" as Nagel
suggests, that he sought forgiveness for the act he committed. However, the widespread
reality of practicing interpersonal relationships with enemy soldiers is unlikely. It
might be impossible for a soldier to try to defend each action he or she performs. For
example, an artillery soldier has the ability to hit a target several miles away from his
position and may never see the object (victim) of his action. The interpersonal
requirement that Nagel views as critical is lacking as battle line are further removed
Nagel's interpersonal view of subject and object needs a great more expansion,
in my opinion, for use as a means for the conduct of war. Today, few soldiers actually
see the object of their military actions. Therefore, it is difficult to consider them as
possible “subjects" Nagel suggests. The development of long range weaponry' removes
soldiers further and further away from the objects of their actions. The United States
has repeatedly used long-range missiles to attack countries such as Iraq and Sudan It
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has been noted that "Americans don't like close, bloody conflict, understandably
preferring the safe standoff warfare that can be waged by cruise missiles.”42 Long-
range warfare can cause extensive damage to enemy targets while minimizing the loss
to friendly forces. The further removed from the battle, the less personal the conflict
becomes. Nagel s absolutism may be hampered by this problem since justification of
absolutism requires interpersonal interaction. Thus, developing Nagel’s suggested
interpersonal interaction between individuals is somewhat improbable on today’s
extended battlefield.
Manner of Attack on Specific Classes of Persons
1 hroughout history', restrictions on the methods of war have been developed
among nations that include the restrictions on certain weapons, treatment of wounded
and prisoners, etc.. 1 o reiterate his notion, Nagel sees two types of absolutist
restrictions on warfare: “those that limit the legitimate targets of hostility and those that
limit its character, even when the target is acceptable.”43 His first task was to clarify
how attacks on some targets are allowed and others are not.
Nagel uses an example to help explain this distinction:
It may seem paradoxical to assert that to fire a machine gun at someone
who is throwing hand grenades at your emplacement is to treat him as a
human being. Yet the relation with him is direct and straightforward.
The attack is aimed specifically against the threat presented by a
dangerous adversary, and not against a peripheral target through which
he happens to be vulnerable but which has nothing to do with that threat.
For example, you might stop him by machine-gunning his wife and
children, who are standing nearby, thus distracting him from his aim of
blowing you up and enabling you to capture him. But if his wife and
children are not threatening your life, that would be to treat them as
means with a vengeance.
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If someone throws a hand grenade at an emplacement, he makes himself vulnerable to a
legitimate attack to stop his action. I do not believe most U.S. soldiers would commit
an act of killing women and children as a means of stopping an attack from an enemy
since the women and children are not a threat. If the women and children had weapons
aimed at the soldier, then the means of self-preservation may override moral beliefs of
not harming women and children. If threatening with the use of weapons, the women
and children would then lose their noncombatant status and thus become vulnerable to
military targeting. In this example, it does seem allowable for a soldier to fire a weapon
at a legitimate threatening adversary who in turn is performing a similar threatening
action against him or her.
One view that I share with Nagel is the objection to the use of weapons of mass
destruction. These weapons-nuclear, thermonuclear, biological or chemical--are
undiscrimmating when they are used. Not only do they destroy military targets, they
have the ability to harm or destroy all surrounding life as well. When these weapons
are employed, the targets can seemingly be reduced to be less than human. This action
can perhaps be compared to spraying aerosol bug killer over an area. The spray is
indiscriminate at what or whom it affects. Anything that comes within its path can be
affected by causing physical harm or even death regardless if the victims were the
primary target of its use. The same can be said of weapons of mass destruction.
Anyone who passes through the path of its devastation can be harmed or killed
regardless of their combative status. Some of these weapons can have long term effects
as well. The employment of nuclear weapons can cause high radiation levels that can
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linger in the target areas for extended periods of time depending upon its concentration
Thus, even when a conflict has ended, the ability for civilians to rebuild their lives may
be hindered due to this contamination. When using weapons of mass destruction, one
takes aim not only at military targets, but at the survival of the country that is targeted
At this point, Nagel takes a look at the means of targeting specific classes of
persons. The above view helps to strengthen the need to understand the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the
role of innocent beings is occupied by noncombatants. In absolutist practices, it is
considered murder when a noncombatant is killed:
This has been thought to raise two sorts of problems: first, the widely
imagined difficulty of making a division, in modem warfare, between
combatants and noncombatants; second, problems deriving from the
connotation of the word 'innocence.’ 4
''
To answer the first problem, Nagel begins by attempting to distinguish combatants from
noncombatants. The dividing line is not very distinct, but he does not view the task to
be difficult. Some have viewed women and children as possible threats because women
bear children who may eventually grow up and become soldiers. This suggestion is
disturbing for some. More troubling to determine are support personnel who may or
may not wear uniforms. They are categorized not on the basis of their status as human
beings, but on whether or not they pose or support some form of an objective threat:
I believe they can be plausibly classified by applying the condition that
the prosecution of conflict must direct itself to the cause of danger, and
not to what is peripheral. The threat presented by an army and its
members does not consist merely in the fact that they are men, but in the
fact that they are armed and are using their arms in the pursuit of certain
objectives. 4
''
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Nagel s view is similar to Jeffrie G. Murphy’s in that individuals who contribute to the
threat by bearing arms or providing logistical support to those who fight are susceptible
to potential targeting in warfare. Supporting soldiers with the basic necessities of life
that sustain them as human beings, such as a farmer providing subsistence, does not
constitute the right to be targeted.
The second problem concerns the notion of “innocence.” Nagel notes the
emphasis here is not of moral innocence nor is it of moral guilt, but more on the
immediacy of the threat by the individual. If it were, then we would be allowed to kill
an evil, noncombatant librarian living in enemy territory w-ho supported the malicious
actions of his or her country. Also, we would not be allowed to harm a drafted soldier
who was serving his duty to his country even though it was his belief that the military
action was immoral and he did not wish to harm anyone. These two examples help to
distinguish how:
moral innocence has very little to do w'ith it, for in the definition of
murder ’innocent' means ’currently harmless,’ and it is opposed not to
’guilty’ but to ‘doing harm .’ 47
Nagel " s second group of restrictions is the limitation on what may be done even
to combatants which are sometimes more difficult to delineate. Nagel understands that
some of the restrictions “may be arbitrary or conventional, and some may have to be
derived from other sources; but [he] believefs] that the condition of directness and
relevance in hostile relations accounts for them to a considerable extent.”4 * Nagel
explores several cases to explain his view. The first example explores the medical
domain:
. .
medical attention is a species of attention to completely general
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human needs, not specifically the needs of a combat soldier, and our
conflict with the soldier is not with his existence as a human being
.
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Medical personnel and wounded soldiers hold special status in combat situations.
According to the rules of warfare, they are to be treated as noncombatants for the fact
doctors are by profession bound to preserve life and not take it. Wounded soldiers are
unable to participate in combat and therefore are designated off limits to targeting.
Another condition is the idea of “human needs” not simply “soldierly needs”
which can be applied to certain circumstances. The use of cruel weapons that were
designed to maim and dismember individuals seems beyond the extent of merely trying
to stop enemy forces. The use of napalm and flame-throwers are examples since they
cause “bums [which] are both extremely painful and extremely disfiguring~far more
than any other category of wound.”50 These weapons can be viewed as dehumanizing
their victims because these methods fail to separate the soldier from the human being.
This may reduce the individual to be viewed as less than a person, which Nagel holds as
important to the proper conduct of warfare. Another example is stopping a charging
enemy soldier. The soldier may be easily stopped with a round of small arms
ammunition. It would not be necessary to use a tank round to stop this soldier’s attack.
Thus, the means of the attack should be proportionate to the target.
The final condition for proper means of attack requires that the same limitations
of hostility used toward individuals, should be used in regard to attacks against enemy
countries. This limitation of hostility should include the nation’s economy, agriculture,
transportation system, etc.. Nagel views nations as complicated individuals.
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Aggressors need to abide by the same rules for nations as they would for human beings
when it comes to performing hostile actions.
Utilitarianism and Absolutist Conflict
With his outline of utilitarianism and absolutism theories complete, Nagel
returns to the conflict between the two. Some acts may be prohibited by absolutist
guidelines yet justified under utilitarian guidelines. However, certain acts may be so
unacceptable, such as murder and torture, that they cannot be justified by any means:
They are supposed never to be done, because no quantity of resulting
benefit is thought capable otjustifying such treatment of a person . 51
The conflict between the two theories develops when an individual rejects one theory
over another when it comes to difficult decisions. Someone may exclude an absolutist
command in favor of an action that produces more acceptable consequences thus
adopting a utilitarian theory. The same may be true of an individual who holds
utilitarian beliefs yet decides to act because of absolutist reasons. In either example, it
may be "possible to feel that one has acted for reasons insufficient to justify violation of
the opposing principle."'' The problem becomes even more extreme when one has to
decide how to act when issues of massive death and destruction are involved.
Nagel suggests that there may or may not be principles available that could help
solve such difficult dilemmas. Not only is this unknown, but one:
must face the pessimistic alternative that these two forms of moral
intuitions are not capable of being brought together into a single,
coherent moral system, and that the world can present us with situations
in which there is no honorable or moral course for a man to take, no
course free of guilt and responsibility . 5
'
Because we are “only human,” Nagel assumes that “it is naive to suppose that there is a
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solution to every moral problem with which the world can face us.”54 Regardless,
Nagel attempted to outline his view of how absolutism can be adopted to develop
guidelines for the conduct of war. He did this through explaining two absolutist
restrictions which control the class of targeted persons and the manners of attack
against these persons. Absolutism may offer some general guidance for moral decision
making. However, Nagel’s arguments are weak since the targeted persons are no longer
simple, clear cut “subjects” and “objects” as Nagel would like to treat them.
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CHAPTER 3
BRANDT’S RULE-UTILITARIANISM
Richard B. Brandt’s main goal in his article “Utilitarianism and the Rules of
War, is to answer, from a moral standpoint: What ought to be the rules of war? His
discussion is focused on the “moral proscriptions and prescriptions that should govern
the treatment by a belligerent, and in particular by its armed forces, of the nationals of
an enemy, both combatants and noncombatants.” 1 Brandt chooses to answer this
question through the examination of rule-utilitarianism. For Brandt, rule-utilitarianism
can be defined in the following manner:
RU: applies to views according to which the rightness of an act is not
fixed by its relative utility, but by conformity with general rules or
principles; the utilitarian feature of these theories consists in the fact that
the correctness of these rules or principles is fixed in some way by the
utility of their general acceptance."
In order to restrict his thesis, Brandt’s aim is to discuss rules of war from the viewpoint
of a ‘contractual ’ rule-utilitarian. He believes this perspective is a ven/ helpful one for
considering the development of rules of warfare and that its implications “will confirm
us both in conclusions about certain normative rules and in a conviction that a
contractual utilitarian view of such matters is essentially sound." 4 Because of his
tendency toward utilitarianism, Brandt opposes some of Nagel’s statements about
absolutism as discussed in the previous chapter.
Nagel’s “Absolutism"
Brandt understands Nagel to be supporting two absolutist theses:
1 the general view that certain kinds of actions are, from a moral point
of view, absolutely out of bounds, no matter what the consequences; and
2. a specific prohibition that applies this principle to the area of our
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interest/
Brandt believes Nagel to be somewhat hesitant in his defense of these two theses. This
hesitancy is implicated by Nagel when he suggests he is “offering only l a somewhat
qualified defense of absolutism, and concedes that in extreme circumstances there may
be exceptions to his absolutist principles after all.”6 The only thing Brandt regards
Nagel as committed to is his criticism of utilitarianism.
Nagel's tentativeness to support his own theories makes Brandt leery to even
refer to Nagel's idea as “absolutism.” Regardless, it is the only anti-utilitarian proposal
that Nagel attempts to defend and this is what Brandt believes is worth discussing.
Brandt notes that a rule-utilitarian may agree with Nagel that there are some
actions which could be considered morally wrong no matter what consequences are
involved. Certain actions of this type are expressed as forbidden in military rules of
war. These rules can be found in formal treaties such as those developed out of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions. These rules are legally binding and military personnel
are trained to understand and abide by them. The various services within the
Department of Defense have developed guidelines based on these conventions, and the
United States Army recognizes the rules of war as written in the Department of the
Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare . Some of these rules include the
following:
It is especially forbidden ... to declare that no quarter will be
given.
.
It is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy who,
having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has
surrendered at discretion .
It is especially forbidden ... to employ arms, projectiles, or
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering . .
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The pillage of a town or place, even when taken bv assault is
prohibited
A commander may not put his prisoners to death because their
presence retards his movements or diminishes his power of resistance by
necessitating a large guard, or by reason of their consuming supplies, or
because it appears certain that they will regain their liberty through the
impending success of their forces. It is likewise unlawful for a
commander to kill his prisoners on grounds of self-preservation, even in
the case of airborne or commando operations, although the
circumstances of the operation may make necessary rigorous supervision
of and restraint upon the movement of prisoners of war. 7
These rules of war can be interpreted as absolute in that they should never be violated.
Brandt asserts that a rule-utilitarian would have to atrree and that utilitarian
considerations would not be able to morally justify' violating these rules. A rule-
utilitanan may go on to say that in accepting and abiding by these rules, in the long run,
one may contribute to long-range utility. Brandt explains the rule-utilitarian as taking a
two-level approach:
that in justifying the rules, utilitarian considerations are in order and
nothing else is; whereas in making decisions about what to do in
concrete circumstances, the rules are absolutely binding. In the rule-
utilitarian view, immediate expediency is not a moral justification for
infringing the rules.
x
Despite this conviction, Brandt makes a footnote about the conceivability of rules of
war that could possibly allow' an unthinkable action so as to prevent total devastation
In this view, an unthinkable act may be justified if founded on the grounds of it being a
last resort for self-preservation to uphold a nation's autonomy. A nation may find it
necessary to invoke a rule which supports last resort preservation and place all other
restrictions aside. L. Oppenheim commented on this issue when he noted that if a
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society is threatened to the point where its fundamental values are at risk, then the
society as a whole could possibly be free from restrictions in order to do what “they
deem to be decisive for the ultimate vindication of the law of nations.'’9 For example,
today the United States has a policy of “no first use" for weapons of mass destruction,
such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. However, this was not the case in
1 945. The United States viewed the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945 as “the only measures capable of convincing the Japanese to surrender
unconditionally and, hence, shortening the war and limiting further Allied casualties.” 10
This action was seen as a means of last resort to end the prolonged fighting and
extensive loss of life and to preserve the integrity of the nations involved in the conflict.
The policy of “no first use will hopefully keep this type of devastating act from being
committed again
Brandt sees Nagel as defending only one absolutist principle; the one which
places restrictions on legitimate targets and weapons. Nagel defends that:
hostility or aggression should be directed at its true object. This means
both that it should be directed at the person or persons who provoke it
and that it should aim more specifically at what is provocative about
them. The second condition will determine what form the hostility may
appropriately take.
1
1
Brandt finds the application of this principle somewhat simple for the two-person cases
that Nagel discusses. He finds it more difficult to apply the principle in “the
identification of morally acceptable militan/ operations” which can become more
large scale and complicated. Brandt reinterprets Nagel's principle in the following
manner in order for it to be applicable to military operations:
Persons may be attacked 1 deliberately’ only if their presence of their
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position prevents overpowering the military forces of the enemy in some
way, and they may be attacked only in a manner that is reasonably
related to the objective of disarming or disabling them
.
15
Even with this reinterpretation, it is still too vague for Brandt to accept For him, it
leaves open cases such as attacks on support services or ammunition factories. As it
stands by itself, Nagel’s principle is not self-evident to Brandt which leads him to
formulate his utilitarian answer.
Morally Justifiable Rules
Before he can answer his question about which rules of war are morally
permissible, Brandt sees the need to clarify the term “rules of war.” Brandt is refemnu
to rules such as those that have been formulated through articles of the Hague and
Geneva Convention and as stated in formal treaties. Military members understand that
these rules are mandatory and military operations should be developed accordingly. For
example, generals are not authorized to deliberately relocate the civilian population of a
village simply because the village location would serve as a good site for the unit
headquarters. Military members know, as LT Calley found out, that violation of these
rules could lead to prosecution Because of this, these rules are spoken by Brandt as
having “authoritative status.”
In offering a utilitarian answer, Brandt is accepting a “contractual ' utilitarian
answer. By this, Brandt means that he “accepts] the utilitarian answer to the question
which rules of war are morally justifiable because utilitarian rules of war are the ones
rational
,
impartial persons would choose (the ones they would be willing to put
themselves under a contract to obey ).”
14
With this understanding in mind, Brandt
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rephrases his fundamental question to read the following:
What rules would rational, impartial people, who expected their country
at some time to be at war, want to have as the authoritative rules of war—
particularly with respect to the permitted targets and method of attack? 15
Brandt suggests that rules chosen by “rational, impartial persons” would be those rules
that would maximize the expected utility for countries at war. He proposes that these
rules would be developed behind what he calls a “veil of ignorance.” This means,
among other things, the persons would be starting with a blank sheet of rules and not
know who they would be at war with or the type of weapon systems available at the
time of the war. This is suggestive of what was accomplished by the Hague
Conventions where representatives of numerous nations came together to develop rules
of war. These representatives based their judgments for the rules of war on what they
believed to be principles that would protect humanity that they would deem fair to
follow if ever in conflict with one another. So how are we to handle these rules as
nations come and go and weapon technolog}' advances9 This is where Brandt believes
his contractual utilitarian theory can offer an answer. He states the following to be his
contractual utilitarian theory:
(1 ) that rational, impartial persons would choose certain rules of war;
(2) that [he] takes as a basic premise (‘analytic’ in some sense) that a
rule of war is morally justified if and only if it would be chosen by
rational, impartial persons; and
(3) that the rules rational, impartial persons would choose are ones
which will maximize expectable long-range utility for nations at war. ,h
One might question what Brandt means when he requires “expectable" utility in his
theory. To determine this, he says it is necessary to:
consider the things that, on the basis of available evidence, have more
than a negligible probability of happening if A is done, and which are
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different from what probably will happen if B is done.
. . we consider
then, two sets of things: events likely to happen ifA but not B is done,
and events likely to happen if B but not A is done. This gives us a view
of what difference it makes which course of action is taken
.
1
The expectable utility must be different for A and B in order for them to be alternatives.
If an individual is faced with several alternative rules, the one which will maximize
expectable utility, for Brandt, is the correct one to choose. With this stated, Brandt
turns his attention to its clarification.
Utilitarian Rules
The first problem arises when one looks to decide what a rational, impartial
person would choose. Brandt has “suggested that rational persons, choosing behind a
veil of ignorance but believing that their country may well be involved in a war at some
time, would prefer rules of war that would maximize expectable utility, in the
circumstance that two nations are at war Why would one rule be preferable over
another rule? Brandt thinks that regardless if someone is self-interested or altruistic,
they would decide to abide by rules that would maximize expected utility'. In order to
control “utility-maximizing rules of war," Brandt makes the following important
restriction:
The rules of war, then, subject to the restriction that the rules of war may
not prevent a belligerent from using all the power necessary to overcome
the enemy, will be ones whose authorization will serve to maximize
welfare .
l>
I assume the understanding of “welfare” to mean the expectable utility of the rules. His
reasoning for this restriction has to do with the gravity of war. As discussed in chapter
one. “war” is a very difficult beast to define. There are numerous differences from one
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conflict to another. The who, what, where, when and why of wars are seldom the same
for any two conflicts.
Because of the varied nature of war, Brandt even notes that a problem may arise
with attributing rule-utilitarianism to the conduct of war. He sees that “it is possible
that the rules which would maximize expectable utility might vary from one type of war
to another. “ In order to use his contractual rule-utilitarian theory to answer his
question, Brandt limits his position on “war, to be the type which was experienced by
Great Britain in World War II. The British experience was the following:
In the case of World War II, the British thought that Hitler’s Germany
and its policies threatened the very basis of civilized society. The
destruction of Hitler's power seemed so important to the British that they
were willing to stake their existence as a nation on bringing it about.
21
Brandt takes the “position of a nation in a serious war is such, then, that it considers
overpowering the enemy to be absolutely vital to its interests (and possibly to those of
civilized society generally)—so vital, indeed, that it is willing to risk its very existence to
^22
that end “ But w'hat if all the participants in a conflict think this same way? Conflicts
may never come to an end if they did. Brandt thinks this occurrence is doubtful, but if
it does happen “neither side will consent to or follow rules of war which seriously
impair the possibility of bringing the war to a victorious conclusion.” Brandt believes
he has already answered this concern with his restriction of “maximum welfare.” He
claims existing rules of war already respect this restriction:
they are framed in such a way as not to place any serious obstacle in the
way of a nation’s using any available force, if necessary, to destroy the
ability of another to resist.
“ 4
A concern here is the notion of “available force, if necessary.” The interpretation of
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this phrase can open a wide spectrum of possibilities. What would have happened if
Saddam Hussein had seen it as a “necessary” action to use chemical or nuclear weapons
against the invading enemy during the Gulf War? Historically, Iraqi forces had used
chemical weapons during the Iran/Iraq war which caused a major concern to all allied
forces:
Because Saddam Hussein used deadly chemicals in his wars against Iran
and the Kurds, the possibility that he might resort to chemical and/or
biological warfare was considered from the outset of the planning of the
Persian Gulf War . 25
Regardless of the possible use of these types of weapons by Iraq, the need to strike was
deemed more important. The devastating aerial bombardment and follow on land
forces campaign could have been interpreted by Hussein as a threat to his nation and a
justification for the use of such extreme measures for self-preservation. Brandt notes
that Oppenheim makes a comment on this subject:
one of the assumptions underlying the recognized rules of war is that ‘a
belligerent is justified in applying any amount and any kind of force
which is necessary for
. . . the overpowering of the opponent .’ 26
The use of weapons of mass destruction could have been the only means Hussein saw
available to overpower his opponent in order to protect his country. Luckily, this was
not an option that he chose to use. If he had chosen to use them, would he have been
justified in doing so based on the notion of self-preservation and a means to over power
his opponent? It may be hard to determine, but Brandt develops his three rules
restricting military operations which he believes could control such extreme actions.
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Rules Restricting Military Operations
To help establish rules of war, Brandt offers three rules that restrict military
operations. These rules include limitations on prospective targets and weapons of
destruction. He notes these rules include, but are not limited to the following: (1)
humanitarian restrictions of no cost to military operation; (2) humanitarian restrictions
possibly costly to military victory; and (3) acceptance of military losses for
humanitarian reasons.
(1). Humanitarian restrictions ofno cost to military operations. Brandt’s first
rule takes a look into controlling troop actions which offer little expectable utility to the
war effort, yet may bring about severe harm to civilians. He says “such behavior will
naturally be forbidden by rules designed to maximize expectable utility within the
understood restriction."27 For this restriction, Brandt offers examples of the treatment
of prisoners of war and civilians. He states a “policy of good treatment of prisoners
may be expected to make many nations ot both sides better off, and at a cost which in
no way impairs the ability of either to wage the war.”28 There are many rules of war
that protect the rights of prisoners as well as civilians during hostile actions. For
example, Article 4 of the 1907 Hague Convention states that prisoners must be
“humanely treated.”" 9 Article 6 stresses the importance of the equal treatment of
prisoners:
In the absence of a special agreement between the belligerents, prisoners
of war shall be treated as regards board, lodging, and clothing on the
same footing as the troops of the Government that captured them .
70
Brandt would view these two articles as presenting the means for providing greater
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expectable utility to the nations who followed these rules. He states a “strict
prohibition of wanton murder of prisoners has the clear support of utilitarian
considerations.”31 For example, the deliberate killing of prisoners could possibility
cause conflict and encourage counterstnkes. On the other hand, returning prisoners to
their units could serve to support the need to preserve life. In the long run, the fair
treatment of prisoners could serve positively for all members of a conflict.
The same benefit can be said for the fair treatment of noncombatants in
occupied territories. Article 25 of the 1907 Hague Conventions states “the attack or
bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are
undefended is prohibited.” 2 Article 27 continues supporting the protection of
noncombatants:
In sieges and bombardments, all necessary steps must be taken to spare,
as far as possible, building dedicated to religion, art, science, or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the
time for military purposes.
33
Little military benefit is gained from intentionally destroying the livelihood of
noncombatants in occupied territories and may cause more harm than good. Actions
against civilians may cause resentment by the enemy and prolong the conflict. Brandt
sees rules protecting noncombatants as a means of maximizing utility:
So utility is maximized, within our indicated basic limitations, by a strict
rule calling for good treatment of the civilian population of an occupied
territory.
34
The established rules for treating prisoners and noncombatants with the dignity they
deserve as human beings will serve to increase expectable utility over time.
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Oppenherm noted that fair treatment of these mdividuals actually improves the outcome
of war:
In contradistinction to the savage cruelty of former times, belligerents
gradually adopted the view that the realization of the purpose of war was
in no way hampered by consideration shown to the wounded, to
prisoners, and to private individuals who do not take part in the
fighting.
Brandt notes that “obviously these rules, which the maximization of expectable utility
calls for, are rules that command our intuitive assent.”36 Restricting harm to prisoners
and noncombatants can, in the long run, serves to increase expectable utility at very
little cost to ongoing military operations.
(2). Humanitarian restrictions possibly costly to military victory. Brandt’s
second restriction deals with rules governing more difficult circumstances. These
situations fall into a category that Brandt views as “neither clearly permitted nor
definitely prohibited.’”
7
He discusses and suggests rules for several kinds of actions
that fall into this category. His first instance is “doing something which will result in
widespread destruction of civilian life and property and at the same time will add to the
probability of victory but will not definitely decide the war.”
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Illustrations of this type
of action are the use of nuclear weapons and area bombings. Brandt offers what he
considers a “not ideally precise” rule for such actions:
substantial destruction of lives and property of enemy civilians is
permissible only when there is good evidence that it will significantly
enhance the prospect of victory. 39
The interpretation of “good evidence” and “significantly enhance” may require the use
ofjudgment according to Brandt, but he believes the rule can be utilized as a sufficient
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principle for act,on. An illustration of the use of this rule is the area bombing
experienced by Hamburg, Germany. As indicated in the previous chapter, the bombing
succeeded in destroying the city, but did not “enhance the prospect of victory” in the
final outcome. The bombing backfired by allowing the outraged citizens to move to
industrial war supporting efforts for the German military. Brandt thinks his rule could
be accepted by nat.ons in conflict “since following it could be expected to minimize the
human cost of war on both sides, and since it does not involve a significant compromise
of the goal of victory,”40
Brandt is quick to clarity his intentions of using this rule to apply to what he
considers “serious wars,” such as World War II. These “serious wars” are considered
those in which the “stakes are virtually infinite.” Not all conflicts are this extreme and
what may be at stake may be no more than a strip of land or national reputation. The
expectable utility of rules governing these actions may be very important for one nation
but may not be for another. What Brandt develops is a general principle that he sees as
applicable to all types of war:
a military action (e.g., a bombing raid) is permissible only if the utility
(broadly conceived, so that the maintenance of treaty obligations of
international law could count as a utility) of victory to all concerned,
multiplied by the increase in its probability if the action is executed, on
the evidence (when the evidence is reasonably solid, considering the
stakes), is greater than the possible disutility of the action to both sides
multiplied by its probability
.
41
The general principle attempts to set a limit for utility through the probability of the
outcome given that the action is performed. Brandt seems to be referring to the notion
of expectable utility” as required in his contractual rule utilitarian theory. Because of
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the need to set a limit on utility, this general principle may cause problems in its
application, according to Brandt. To serve his purpose, he believes the use of his
“serious war rule” will help since it sets limitless utility for victory. However, there
must be concrete proof that the action will extend the likelihood of victory.
At this point, Brandt sees the need to clarify the development of his suggested
rules:
In practice, it must be expected that each party to a war is likely to
estimate the stakes of victory quite high, so that the rule which has the
best chance of being respected is probably the first one mentioned, and
not any modification of it that would be suggested to an impartial
observer by the second, more general principle.
The reader may have been struck by the fact that these suggested
rules are essentially institutionalized applications of a kind of act-
utilitarian principle for certain contexts. This may seem inconsistent
with the notion of a system of absolute rules themselves justified by
long-range utilitarian considerations. But there is nothing inconsistent in
the suggestion that some of the absolute’ rules should require that in
certain situations an action be undertaken if and only if it will maximize
expectable utility. 42
To illustrate Brandt’s points, the following example can be employed. The aerial
bombardments of Hamburg and Japan were performed as a means to bring conflicts to
an end, yet these actions proved that they did not “increase the probability of victory
”
for their aggressors as previously discussed. A better understanding of how to employ
the utility factors can be tound in the following illustration. The allied forces could
have had two actions to choose to perform against the Germans:
al Bomb Hamburg, Germany
a2 Refrain from bombing Hamburg, Germany
The hedonic utility (HU) for these actions are determined by the hedons and dolors
experienced by all participants. The following breakdown represents the HU for the
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acts.
al : Bomb Hamburg, Germany
Bring quick end to German resistance
Minimize loss of life to allied forces
Destroy German will to fight
+ 1000 hedons
+ 1000 hedons
+ 1000 hedons
-2000 dolors
+ 1000 HU
Cause destruction and loss to German
populace
a2. Refrain from bombing Hamburg, Germany
Limit destruction and loss to German
populace
Continue war
Increase loss of life to allied forces
+ 1000 hedons
-1000 dolors
-1000 dolors
-1000 HU
According to HAU, the Allied Forces must chose to perform al since it maximizes
hedonic utility. To perform this act, according to Brandt’s rules, they must generally
believe that this act will “significantly enhance the prospect of victory.” It may have
been allowable under Brandt’s rule for a serious war, but what consideration should be
made about Article 27 of the Hague Conventions which prohibits the unnecessary
bombardment of civilian structures? If the Hague Conventions are viewed as an
established contract between nations, does the breach of it by one nation, free another
from its agreement? This is sometimes the given explanation as to why Hamburg was
bombed. It had been said that “since the Germans destroyed Amsterdam and Coventry,
the British had a right to destroy Hamburg.”43 It would seem wrong for Germany to
protest about the bombing of Hamburg since they had committed a similar act against
others. A rule from The Law of Land Warfare actually recognizes a rule controlling this
sort of reprisal:
Reprisals are acts of retaliation ... for a purpose of enforcing future
compliance with the recognized rules of civilized warfare . . . Other
means of securing compliance with the law of war should normally be
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exhausted before resort is had to repnsals.
.
. . Even when appeal to theenemy for redress has failed, it may be a matter of policy to consider
before resorting to repnsals, whether the opposing forces are not morelikely to be influenced by a steady adherence to the law of war on the
part of the adversary. 4
Brandt states this
-rule” can govern the use of aerial bombardment as a reprisal if it
maximizes expectable utility. Even though there are international rules against direct
civilian destruction, Brandt suggests that the principle does not exclude the feasibility
of employing extensive civilian bombing as a means to bring about a serious decline in
civilian morale if it could bring about an end to a war through a national revolution.
This may be true but “we know enough about how bombing affects civilian morale to
know that such bombing could be justified only rarely, if at all.”45 Thus it may be
difficult to determine what rule may bring about the most utility.
(3). Acceptance ofmilitary lossesfor humanitarian reasons. Brandt’s third rule
is what he refers to as the economics of warfare, this is “when the ultimate outcome is
not involved, either because the outcome is already clear or because the action is fairly
local and its outcome will not have significant repercussions.”46 He breaks this down
into two cases. The first case questions “when may one inflict large losses on the
enemy in order to avoid smaller losses for oneself, given that the issue of the war is not
in doubt? In other words, once a victor has been decided it seems wrong to continue
to cause further unnecessary harm to the enemy. Another problem is what if the
expected loser, perhaps for national pride, becomes stubborn in giving up the fight?
The stronger forces should not be allowed to lash out and cause severe destruction for
no reason, nor should the losing factor carry on any unnecessary resistance so as to
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prolong the conflict. Further destruction could possibly inhibit the ability of the
noncombatants in the surrounding area from regaining their livelihood once the fighting
IS over. An example of this was evident toward the end of the Gulf War:
The real price of war can never be assessed, for in addition to hard costs,
the fighting exacted incalculable regional costs in the form of long-term
environmental damage, disruption of trade, and population displacement.
Kuwaiti oil wells burned for nearly a year, polluting rainfall up to 1 500
miles away.
The Iraqi forces attempted to destroy any chances the people of Kuwait had to regain
their pre-war oil production. The Iraqi forces set oil rigs on fire and dumped an
enormous amount of oil into the gulf waters. This not only lacked any utility
whatsoever, but it severely damaged the economic and environmental well-being of not
only the people of Kuwait, but all the surrounding countries who used the waters of the
gulf. Clearly there was no regard for the people who would be hurt by these actions.
Because of this, Brandt believes the rules of war should protect the inferior players:
superior power should show utmost patience and not make the terms of
peace so severe as to encourage further resistance. On the other hand,
long-range utility is not served if the rules of war are framed in such a
way as to provide an umbrella for the indefinite continuation of a
struggle by an inferior power. 49
The rule must allow for a country to be able to cause heavy enough losses to bring
about surrender but not so heavy as to be out of proportion to the expected loss to both
sides. Brandt believes that “some such rule appears called for by long-range utilitarian
considerations.
”
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The weaker belligerents also need to know when to give up so as not
to continue further destruction of their own way of life.
59
The second case questions “should there be restrictions on the treatment of any
enemy in the case of local actions which could hardly affect the outcome of the war,
when these may cause significant losses?”51 Brandt notes that rules of this sort are
already in place. The rules governing fair treatment of prisoners and the protection of
noncombatants in occupied areas are depicted from such works as the Hague
Conventions. This case sometimes places the military at a disadvantage because the
protection of combatants and noncombatants may cause a hindrance to military
operations. The disadvantages, however, would more than likely not affect the final
outcome of any conflict. The advantage for both sides being equal in this case, “a
considerable benefit can come to both belligerents in the form of the welfare of their
imprisoned and occupied populations.”52 The preservation of the rights of the
individual is beneficial to both sides. Control by all parties could work out to produce
the most expectable utility in the long-run for most situations. Brandt believes “such
rules will naturally be accepted by rational, impartial people in view of their long-range
benefits.”
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Rules of War and Morality
Brandt’s argument throughout his paper is that there exist rules that “rational,
impartial persons would prefer to any alternative if they were ever engaged in a war.
He also suggested these rules are “morally justified” and thus should be officially
acknowledged and given “authoritative status.” At this point, Brandt contemplates
some questions concerning what rules may be “morally justifiable.” He thinks it “may
be suggested that there will be a considerable discrepancy between what is permitted by
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such ‘morally justifiable- rules of war and what it is morally permissible for a person to
do m time of war.”54 Brandt saw that Nagel noted certain acts were not morally
permissible, such as attacking food trucks or the use of flame-throwers. However,
Brandt is not clear whether Nagel “would say these would be permitted by morally
justifiable rules of war, or even that he recognizes a distinction between what is morally
permissible and what is permitted by morally justifiable rules of war.”55 Brandt
addresses some concerns about whether or not “morally justifiable rules of war could
not be derived from justified moral principles .”56
Brandt sees a clear disparity between “what a person morally may do in wartime
and what is permitted by morally justified rules of war.”57 He believes the rules of war
must be developed in a way that allows for the determination of whether or not a
violation of the rule has occurred: “it must be possible to produce evidence that
determines the question and removes it from the realm of speculation.”58 Should
morally justified rules of war be necessarily self-evident? This may be difficult to
determine considering the brutal nature of war itself.
Brandt believes that individuals who have “firm moral intuitions” can see the
opposition between morally justifiable rules of war and what is morally permitted.
Brandt offers one form of rule-utilitarian theory that he sees as helpful to understand
this difference. This may be viewed as a form of conscience utilitarianism:
A rule-utilitarian theory of morality might say that what is morally
permissible is any action that would not be forbidden by the kind of
conscience which would maximize long-range expectable utility were it
built into people as an internal regulator of their relations with other
sentient beings, as contrasted with other kinds of conscience or not
having a conscience at all .
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Th.s theory places the weight of its utility on the conscience of individuals. This could
establish a division between what are the morally justifiable rules of war and what
would be morally permissible in view of the “ideal rules of conscience.”" How does
one choose what is morally justifiable based on the conscience of individuals? Brandt
suggests that if a person had a choice, they would choose a set of rules that would
“maximize expectable utility” for countries at war. Brandt asserts the following:
. . such a person would realize that international law, like the criminal
law, has its place in human society, that not all decisions can simply be
left to the moral intuitions of the agent, and that the rules of war and
military justice are bound to be somewhat crude 61
If decisions should not be left to the “moral intuitions of the agent” does this conflict
with the “internal regulators” of our conscience that Brandt suggests in his conscience
rule-utilitarian theory? If his offering of conscience utilitarianism is weak in supporting
his argument for rule-utilitarianism, perhaps it is due to his concern of not allowing all
rules to be made based upon the moral intuitions of the agent. Given the opportunity
to develop rules of war under a “veil of ignorance,” Brandt thinks that, regardless of the
“moral intuitions or “internal regulators,” individuals would choose a system that will
produce the most good. He is only suggesting that an individual would “have to
identify the sound moral principles which would be relevant to such a decision.”62
Brandt brings up another question that may be interpreted in two ways. The
question is:
whether a person should follow the actual military rules of his country or
the morally justifiable ones .
63
The first interpretation may be questioning whether the rules are legally binding.
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Brandt considers genuine rules of war as legally binding since they have “authoritative
status. The second question arises: “Is a person morally bound to follow the ‘ideal’
rules of war, as compared with the actual ones (or the legal orders of his officer), if they
come into conflict?”
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This poses a difficult question. Individuals may be given
conflicting orders and then must choose to perform one of them. Do they follow the
morally justified rules of war, the actual rules of war, or the orders of the officers
appointed over them that they are sworn to obey?65 Brandt suggests “that sound moral
principles would not permit obedience to an order forbidden by morally justifiable rules
of war.”66 He does not believe that a military court would ever convict an individual
for disobeying an order if the order violated a morally justifiable rule. St. Augustine
believed this as well since he “attached] great importance to the duty of obedience to
the lawful authorities and considers a soldier is ‘innocent if he obeys an unrighteous
command on the part of the ruler.”67 This is what makes leadership so critical. Leaders
should not order their soldiers to perform acts that violate rules of war, but this
sometimes has happened such as the My Lai Massacre.
The need to refer to “sound moral principles” seems to be Brandt’s answer to
deciding how to determine morally justifiable rules of war. He does not explain what
these “sound moral principles” are and how they can help decide which rules to obey
and which to disobey. I find it difficult to believe that “sound moral principles” would
work under a contractual rule-utilitarian theory, for what one country believes to be a
morally justifiable principle may be a violation for another country according to
individual beliefs. For example, there have been several situations where one group of
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people believe thal in order to protect their way of life they need to kill off their
enem.es or rivals through such means as the practice of ethnic cleansing. Two different
rules may conflict in this case:
Rl. If a group sees the need to protect and preserve one’s way of life,
then it is necessary to kill oft those who are against that way of life.
R2: If a group sees the need to protect and preserve one’s way of life
then it is not permissible to kill those individuals who disagree with
’
another country’s way of life.
Rules may be a mere necessary evil. They are developed to guide actions on what most
would consider moral grounds. However, there are those who may not recognize some
rules because ot their individual set of moral standards. The representatives of the
larger, wealthier countries developed rules knowing they possessed the abilities to
overpower the weak unrepresented countries. This can be viewed as a weakness in
Brandt s theory since the development of international rules of war was not done by
representatives of all possible war participants.
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CHAPTER 4
HARE’S RULES OF WAR
I he final article 1 wish to review is Richard M. Hare's “Rules of War and Moral
Reasoning. He wrote this as a response to the articles by Nagel and Brandt that 1 have
prev lously discussed Hare's objective is to continue Brandt's argument for the
development of rules of war. His aim is to “convince the reader that a sound theoretical
foundation can in principle be provided for moral thinking about war, and that this
foundation is available to Brandt and to those who seek to put his conclusions into
practice I lare sees the contrast between Nagel and Brandt “both striking and
instructive, and [he is] convinced that a decision between two methods is of immense
practical importance."- To further develop Brandt's theory. Hare uses his two-levels of
moral thinking, intuitive and critical, which were designed b\ Hare to consider
problems oi moral conflict 1 his suggested two-level theory approach may be the most
useful among the ones I have discussed as a means to develop rules for decision makinu
tor the conduct of war.
To develop his argument. Hare discusses the proposals from Nagel and Brandt
Hare has the same problem as Brandt in accepting Nagel's adherence to “absolutism"
that Nagel attempts to support in his article “War and Massacre." To review, Nagel is
split between two methods of moral thinking that he refers to as “utilitarian” and
“absolutist ” Hare views Nagel as trying to:
use utilitarian arguments, with all their consideration of the
consequences for good or ill of alternative courses of action; but
sometimes he wants to override such considerations with an absolute
ban. founded upon simple general rules, on certain kinds of actions.'
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In his attempt, according to Hare. Nagel faded to find a means to actually solve the
conflict between the two ways of think,ng. Hare notes that an example of this can be
found in Nagel's discussion of the law of double effect:
he claims it as a merit of that dev ice that it avoids the problem that in
certain cases nothing one could do would be morallv permissible ' at
the end of the paper he admits that his own position has this same
consequence. Absolutism, or an impure absolutism which tries to
incorporate utilitarian elements without coherently relating them to its
own absolutist structure, is bound to have this trouble. 4
According to Hare. Nagel seems to get himself locked into a one level approach.
absolutism 1 his is where Hare finds the main problem
1 can think of no other way of registering what happens in cases where
conflicts of principles are decided that is open to the user of a one-level
structure of moral thinking. Since, therefore, a one-level structure seems
condemned either to having no determinate procedure for settling moral
conflicts, or to having principles of ever increasing complexity, we can
onlv be content with it if we are happy with the complexity or the
indeterminacy. 1 am not yet taking sides on the question ofhow simple
moral principles have to be As we shall see, it depends on the purposes
lor which the principles are to be used, different sorts of principles are
appropriate to different roles in our moral thinking."
\\ ith the general understanding of Nagel's problems, Hare believes Brandt has a
method of overcoming this problem Brandt, like Hare, has dev eloped a two level
approach to try to answer “What from a moral point of view, ought to be the rules of
war 1 Brandt believes there is a need to refer to “sound moral principles"’ as an aid to
solving conflicts of rules. Moral principles and rules must work together and balance
each other out Brandt suggests these two criteria are required for militarv decision
making:
1 suggest that a person would realize that international law has its
place in human society, that not all decisions can simply be left to the
moral intuitions of the agent. .
.
[I] only suggest that sound moral
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principles would not permit obedience to an order forbidden bv morally
justifiable rules of war.'
Brandt views the need of international law as the basis for the rules of war as developed
under a veil of ignorance by those who could be expected to have to abide by them
1 hese laws would be designed to produce the most utility for those affected. Hare notes
that Brandt directs the need to work both with “simple general rules and with
calculations about consequences [and has on his] hands the problem of reconciling the
two ways ol thinking. * Hare views these sound moral principles and rules based upon
international law as Brandt s two-level approach to developing a contractual rule-
utilitarian theory lor rules ot war Hare expands on Brandt's theories to clarify and
explain the conflict between the two levels.
1 w o-Level Approach
I lare gives a clearer picture ot this '"two-level approach in his work Moral
Thinking: Its Levels. Method, and Point This approach views the development of
low er and higher lev els of thinking which Hare entitles the “intuitive’' and “critical"
levels ol moral thinking He says these two “levels ot thinking are both concerned with
moral questions ol substance, but they handle them in different ways, each appropriate
to the different circumstances in which, and purposes for which the thinking is done."
'
For Hare, his proposed theory can be interpreted as a “two-level utilitarian theory, under
which our moral thinking is rule-utilitarian at the intuitive level but is act-uti 1 itarian at
the critical level
"
" These two methods collapse at the critical level for Hare. He
attempts to discuss and clarify the distinctions through examples of moral conflicts
intending to explain circumstances with conflicting duties.
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I hose who say that there can just be irresoluble conflicts of duties are
always those who have confined their thinking about morality to the
intuitive level. At this level the conflicts are indeed irresoluble. but at
the critical level there is a requirement that we resolve conflict, unless
we are to confess that our thinking has been incomplete. We are not
thinking critically if we just say ‘there is a conflict of duties' I ought to
do A, and I ought to do B. and 1 can't do both ' But at the intuitive level
it is perfectly permissible to say this. The critical level is that if you
have conflicting duties, one of them isn't your duty. 11
1 here are many times where conflicts of this sort arise, that we ought to do A and ought
to do B, but we cannot do both How do we decide what we "ought'’ to do 9 Hare
believes that "what is required is an understanding of the two levels of moral thinking
and of the different ways that ought is used in each of them. 12
Intuitive Level
1 he intuitive level of moral thinking is viewed as the basic level at which
ordinary people formulate and utilize principles to guide actions Sometimes the phrase
rules of thumb mat be invoked to help explain how these principles are implemented
Hare dislikes this use of the term and prefers to refer to them as "prima facie
principles":
Such principles express ‘prima facie duties' and, although formally
speaking they are just uni versal prescriptions, are associated, ow ing to
our upbringing, with very firm and deep dispositions and feelings. Am
attempt to drive a wedge between the principles and the feelings will
falsify the facts about our intuitive thinking. Having the principles, in
the usual sense of the word, is hav ing disposition to experience the
feelings, though it is not, as some intuitionists would have us believe,
incompatible with submitting the principles to critical thought when that
is appropriate and safe.'' 1
'
I his is w here moral education can play a major role. If we teach our children the
"right or "best" thing to do from an early age. they may grow with the understanding
of how ,0 do the
-right" or "best'- thing. To do this, it seems essential to make
principles somewhat clear and concise This could make learning them easy for all
levels of intelligence or education. The military does this with the use of the acronym
MS I Keep It Simple) when developing guidelines for soldiers. This is a critical poim
lor Hare since his concern is that “there is a degree of complexity beyond which we are
unable to learn principles
" n
Thus, there is the need for simplicity to ensure the
principles can be understood and applied easily.
Along the simplicity line, the United States Army has established seven simple
values that are believed to be at the heart of what it means to be a successful soldier
Values are what we. as a profession, judge to be right They are more
than words-they are the moral, ethical, and professional attributes of
character ( )ur character is what enables us to withstand the rigors of
combat or the challenges ot daily life that might tempt us to compromise
our principles such as integrity, loyalty, or selflessness. Ultimately,
strengthening the values that make up our character enables us to
strengthen our inner self, strengthen our bonding to others, and
strengthen our commitment to a higher calling .' 5
I hese values, which can be viewed as principles at the intuitive level, include the
following: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integritv. and personal
courage Soldiers are educated on these values which are to be held sacred as a means
for guidance. I or example, duty , defined as "obedience and disciplined performance—
despite difficulty or danger. '' is an extremely important quality to practice in the face
of hostile action Soldiers are taught that it is their duty to obey orders from their
superiors Samuel P Huntington argues the need for soldiers to obey the legal orders of
their superiors is of utmost importance to the military profession and therefore a rule of
conduct
l or the [military] profession to performs its function, each level within it
must be able to command the instantaneous and loyal obedience of
subordinate levels Consequently, loyalty and obedience are the highest
military virtues: the rule of obedience is simply the expression of that
one among the military virtues upon which all the others depend ' When
the military man receives a legal order from an authorized superior, he
does not argue, he does not hesitate, he does not substitute his own
views; he obeys instantly. He is judged not by the policies he
implements, but rather by the promptness and efficacy with which he
carries them out His goal is to perfect an instrument of obedience; the
uses to which that instrument is put are beyond his responsibility
.
1
Once orders are given they are to be obeyed without question which is the discipline the
military tries to instill in their soldiers Hare believes that this is the only wav victor}
can be achieved in a just war 1 thereby exhibiting the success of the training. If soldiers
disobeyed orders or were derelict in their duties, the militarv infrastructure could be
jeopardized But are all orders and duties absolute 0 What if they are unlawful or
conflicting0 Conflicts may arise among the seven values leaving soldiers with little
guidance to decide how to act
Hare identifies some problems with this line of intuitive thinking Because
circumstances are so diverse, no two situations will ever be exactly the same, thus
different principles and methods of application will be required He states that
"although the relatively simple principles that are used at the intuitive level are
necessary for human moral thinking, they are not sufficient ” Because situations are
so diverse, every situation will have new aspects that make it distinct from other
situations. The principles we have learned may have worked in the past, but may not
necessarily work in the future. So how are we to decide whether or not the principles
are appropriate? No matter how well we have intuited these general principles, we are
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destined to find ourselves in circumstances where our principles conflict. This conflict
will need to be clarified before a decision to act can be made. This is where Hare
believes we must refer to the next level of moral thinking: the critical level.
Critical Level
Critical thinking has a two-fold mission: (1 ) select the best prima facie
principles for intuitive thinking; and (2) resolve conflicts among the principles when the
situation arises, for its first mission. Hare believes that “well conducted critical
thought will justify the selection of prima facie principles on the ground that the general
acceptance of them will lead to actions which do as much good, and as little harm, as
possible. 1 he critical level of thinking does not require an appeal to intuitions as
required by the intuitive level; to do so would embody the same sort of deficiency found
at the lower level. Hare defines critical thinking as consisting in “making a choice
under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concepts and by the
non-moral facts, and by nothing else 1 He previously referred to this theory as the
“decision of principle.”" These principles are not to be confused with the prima facie
principles used at the intuitive level. A principle from the critical level is one used
under “unlimited specificity.” To clarify his use. Hare makes a distinction between
“generality'
1
and “universality” in relation to specificity:
Briefly, generality is the opposite of specificity, whereas universality is
compatible with specificity, and means merely the logical property of
being governed by a universal quantifier and not containing individual
constants. The two principles ‘Never kill people’ and ‘Never kill people
except in self-defense or in cases of adultery or judicial execution’ are
both equally universal, but the first is more general (less specific) than
the second. Critical principles and prima facie principles, then, are both
universal prescriptions; but whereas the former can be, and for their
purposes have to be, highly specific, the latter can be, and for their
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purposes have to be relatively general Just how general thev should be
Ul dePend on the circumstances and temperaments of individuals. 23
1 he specificity of the principles governing the performance of actions may sometimes
be difficult to determine since it is virtually impossible to know every possible situation
one will face as well as how to handle these situations Hare believes that we can refer
to the "principles imbibed in the course of our upbringing”24 to guide how we make
decisions. Hare advocates the notion that these principles develop our moral language
which will lead us to the second mission of critical thinkina
We acquire, mainly by education, a number of 'relatively general
principles
. these principles we usualh follow’ unquestioning!) so lone
as there is no conflict between them If w e have been well brought up^
this situation is satisfactory most of the time. But we are powerless to
resolve conflicts between principles in a rational manner unless we
resort to thinking at the critical level.
. Further we cannot at the
intuitive level rationally examine the principles that we at first
uncritically accept, or rationally replace those found to be
unacceptable.
2 '
W hen our intuitive principles come into conflict. Hare believes we need to refer
to critical thinking as a means to decide what decision to make. At this level, principles
cannot be in conflict with one another. To ensure this is the case. Hare uses reference
to utilitarianism as a means of conflict resolution
According to Hare, upon such conflicts as tend to arise at the level of
'unexamined' principles, what is needed is critical thinking which
proceeds under the constraints of logic and non-moral facts alone. Such
critical thinking will, according to Hare, proceed on a basis similar to
act-utilitarianism, considering all the features of the conflicting situation
and deciding accordingly [presumably electing that which brings the
most benefit
]
As Hare would have it. intuition alone cannot help in
deciding cases of conflict, critical thinking must be done. 2
'
1
1 lare advocates a type of utilitarianism that focuses on utility that has been interpreted
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as expected preference utility ." 2 This method evaluates outcomes by considering the
extent to which preferences are satisfied and frustrated The value of a satisfaction or
frustration is weighted according to the strength of the preference. For example, if an
act were performed, it could essentially satisfy the preferences of some individuals
while frustrate the preferences of others. It would be necessary to calculate (with
weighted intensity) the difference between the sum of the preferences that are satisfied
and the sum of the preferences that are frustrated This would yield the expected
preference utility of the act Hare notes that this manner of calculation may sometimes
cause concerns since he believes that "preferences are certainly often alterable, and this
fact has very wide implications for utilitarian theory
":s
This may make it necessarv to
"make some assumptions about the general sorts of preferences people are likely to
have and the relative weight that they are likely to place on them
"29
What was a
preference lor someone today may not be a preference tor that same individual
tomorrow
As mentioned earlier. Hare's two-level approach has been interpreted as rule-
utilitarian at the lower level and act-utilitarian at the critical level One of the concerns
is Hare's claim that act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism can collapse into one
another when their employment is examined
Hare in fact claims, the act utilitarian and the rule-utilitarian
approaches will lead to the same moral decisions. This is so because
choosing between two alternative moral rules is logically equivalent to
choosing betw een the act of adopting the first moral rule and the act of
adopting the second
. . when we choose between two alternative moral
rules at the critical level, even if we use the act-utilitarian conceptual
framework in making our choice, this will in no way prevent us from
taki ng account of the social effects of either moral rule, including its
expectation effects.'"
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Hare's moral theory has seemingly led to a development of moral reasoning for
Individuals. He expects us to use what we have learned through our moral education
which are those principles that lead us to make decisions at the intuitive level Through
use and experience we are able to differentiate between intuitive principles when
conflicts arise through critical thinking Hare sees this as amounting to the employment
ol act-utilitarian and rule-utilitarian techniques
Conflict Resolution
1 o help elucidate the need for conflict resolution it would serve to review an
example scenario. When soldiers begin their service in the military, they must take an
oath ol service. Soldiers swear to “support and defend the Constitution of the United
States and to bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and obey the orders of
the 1 resident ol the United States and the orders of the oillcers appointed over ' them
1 his oath is essentially a promise to the United States Government and the people of the
nation that they will perform their obligations of this oath In the Army Field Manual.
FM 100-5, Operations
, it states
1 he nation expects its Army to adhere to the highest standards of
professional conduct and to reflect the ideals of American values The
American people demand a high-quality Army that honors the core
values of the Constitution it is sworn to uphold-a strong respect for the
rule of law. human dignity and individual rights.
'
I his statement reflects America's expectation that the Army is to be a mainstay of what
Americans hold as high moral v alues. I he obligations of soldiers are thus extremely
extensive including obligations to self, fellow soldiers, superiors, and the people of our
nation Where does the highest obligation fall 9
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Suppose I am ordered by a superior officer ro perform some act that I believe to
be unlawful, such as falsifying vehicle maintenance records. Performing this act will in
no way harm anyone nor disrupt the mission of the unit. It would simply make my
commander look good in the eyes of her superiors on how vehicles are currently
maintained in the unit What she has asked me to do. however, is to violate my
integrity in reporting the truth of v ehicle maintenance status I am faced with two
alternatives.
al Report false vehicle maintenance status
a2 Report true vehicle maintenance status.
1 hesk. two alternatives present a conflict between two prima facie principles (dun and
integrity) requiring two contradictory actions. The essential problem is "to determine
which ol these principle should be applied to yield a prescription for this specific
situation i he critical level of moral thinking offers us a method to judge the relative
merits ol the alternatives by referring to past moral judgments made about similar
situations. I he first step is to refer to basic prima facie principles.
According to Hare, critical thinking may serve as an aid in the selection of
certain prima facie principles that may best guide our actions
1 he best set is that whose acceptance yields actions, dispositions, etc.
most nearl v approximating to those which would be chosen if we were
able to use critical thinking all the time.
14
In my example, I know it is my duty to obey orders from a superior officer. 1 also know
that my integrity (defined as doing what is right, legally and morally) is at stake Either
I disobey orders, violating my obligation to my superior or disregard my integrity.
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violating trn obligation to myself. Because these principles conflict,
the basic intuitive values that I have learned I must now look to the
1 cannot refer to
critical level of
moral thinking to help guide my actions.
Besides helping to select specific prima face principles, critical thinking has
another purpose which is to resolve conflicts among these principles If the selection of
specific principles is conducted with some care and consideration, conflicts may arise
onh in unique situations, according to Hare He believes we may be able to '‘sort the
matter out intuitively, letting one principle override the other in this case, without
recourse to critical thinking. I o determine when one principle should override
another. Hare suggests the following
I 0 treal a principle as overriding, then, is to let it always override other
principles when they conflict with it and. in the same way. let it override
all other prescriptions, including non-universalizable ones Note that I
say treat as It might be thought a defect in mx account that I do not try
to what it is for a principle to be overriding, but onl\ what it is to
treat a principle as overriding, if someone treats a principle as
overriding all others, but does not let any other override it, then the
words he uses in expressing the principle are so used that they express
lor him an overriding principle.'
Hare believes prima facie principles can be overridden since they may be both
"universal (they contain no individual constants and start with a universal quantifier), in
another sense they are not universal (they are not universally binding; one may make
exceptions to them Allowing one principle to override another, since they max not
be universally binding, may not be the case for every situation. When the conflict is
more complex, the principles max need some qualification bx putting the conflict of the
principle aside and focusing on the situation instead. Hare gives his interpretation of
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this line of thinkmu
he princip es, since they are in conflict, cannot be altogether relied on
l am compelled to depart from one or the other, and do not know which
o let me put the principles aside for the time belmt and examine
carefully the particular case to see what critical thinking would say about
This is not suggesting that the principles are not a concern in deeding action for an
indn .dual Hare believes that over time experience will teach us which situations will
suffice with pnma facie principles and which situations will require answers from
critical thinking It is also possible to utilize both levels at the same time:
I o say that it is impossible to keep intuitive and critical thinking going
in the same thought-process is like saying that in a battle a commander
cannot at the same time be thinking of the details of tactics, the overall
aim of victory
, and the principles (economy of force, concentration of
force, offensive action, etc.) which he has learnt when learning his trade
Good generals do it The good general is one who wins his battles, not
one who has the best prima facie principles; but the best pnma facie
principles are those which, on the whole, win battles
'
I his illustration demonstrates how the two-level approach mav incorporate a wide
range of applicability 1 he average human mind has the ability to process an extensive
amount of information at the same time. 1 o work at the higher level without
encompassing aspects of the lower level would probably be unsuccessful.
Returning to my example of the vehicle maintenance status reports, how should
1 choose to act in this case
1
? To answer this we may need to look at what Hare discusses
as "moral principles.” Hare finds it somewhat difficult to find a definition of ""moral."
He sees the need of differentia to distinguish moral judgments from other judgments.
I o do this, he uses the notion of '"overridingness" as the differentiating property:
We might suggest as a first approximation that a use of 'ought' or ‘must'
is a moral use in this sense if the judgments containing it is ( 1
)
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prescriptive; (2) universal izable; and (3) overriding.
. 1 may say in
passing that, if the attempt to define 'moral’ in these terms, or in a more
developed version of them, were successful, 1 should not mind
substituting the expression
‘overriding-prescriptive-universalizable’ for
the expression moral, in this sense, if it were not so cumbrous. 40
Hare finds the need to qualify this definition once he admits the idea that moral
principles may be overridden when he notes that “prima facie moral principles can be
overridden, not only by other moral principles, but by non-moral prescriptions, without
ceasing to be held as moral principles
” J1
With this qualification in mind. Hare establishes a two sub-class approach to
understanding a man s moral principles
(
1 ) those universal prescriptive principles which he does not allow to be
oxerndden; these will all be what 1 called 'critical moral principles,’ and
are therefore capable of being made so specific and so adapted to
particular cases that they do not need to be overridden. (2) those prima
facie principles which, although they can be overridden, are selected in
the way above described, by critical thinking, in the course of which use
is made of moral principles of the first sub-class.
With this understanding, I must determine where my understanding of the moral
principles of duty and integrity fall within these two sub-classes in order to determine if'
one can override the other. Part of Hare’s theory has to do with what he believes is the
need to understand the logical use of "moral” words:
the first step that the moral philosopher has to take, in order to help
us think better (i.e. more rationally) about moral questions, is to get to
understand the meanings of the words used in asking them; and the
second step, which follows directly from the first, is to give an account
of the logical properties of the w ords, and thus of the canons of rational
thinking about moral questions.
1 lare has some concerns about how we can interpret and use moral words. He believes
that "the selection of principles for use in this world of ours, facts about the world and
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the people in are relevant "« Hare stresses the idea that there must be a level of
moral thinking that is available beyond the level of logical properties of moral words
and reach a level of pure evaluation He states that "the appeal to moral intuitions will
never do as a basis for a moral system '’15 His "hope then is that by investigating the
meaning ol the moral words we shall manage to generate logical canons which will
govern our moral thinking. 4 In this case, I believe integrity must override duty. I hold
the belief that my primary obligation is to be true to myself. 47 My commander may lose
some respect tor me by my disobeying her order, but that is far less important, for me.
than m\ ability to live with myseH knowing I have lied on official documents. The
consequences of al would cause more personal and possible collateral harm (if the
falsification was ever exposed) than a2 Would I be prosecuted for disobeying the
order ’ Probablv not
i lare notes a problem with his approach to moral thinking He realizes the
possibility of encountering individuals “who know of only the intuitive level of moral
thinking, to have any moral principles; for they cannot justify their ‘moral principles' by
appeal to critical thinking I hese individuals mav be unable to distinguish the
difference between moral principles and other principles. Would an officer, based on
his her abilitv to think critically, he able to make the distinction for a subordinate
soldier who mav not have the ability? Hare believes it is possible:
We can, by saying that a principle is for them a moral principle if. either
( 1 ) it is treated by them as overriding (and such people may well so treat
even prima facie principles, though it will put them in familiar straits if
ever the principles conflict), or (2) //they were constrained (perhaps bv
such a conflict-situation) to do some critical thinking, however primitiv e,
they would justify the principle by appeal to some higher principle
treated as overriding. But it may be best simply to say that there is a
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difficulty, in the case of such people, in distinguishing their moral
principles in the sense we are after: this is a sign of a gap in their
thinking rather than ours. 4v
I his is evident in the mentoring that takes place between superiors and subordinates.
As Brandt indicated, military education and training should include schooling in the
understanding and application of laws of war Hare suggests that “this training should
be backed up by legal enforcement where possible."'
1
1 believe he is referring to
perhaps not the ••training' of the laws of war, but the implementation of the laws of war
which should hold ''authoritative status" as Brandt suggested, in order for them to be
binding I lare saw this as a major concern during the Vietnam conflict He stated that
l .\cn when armies are lighting wars which can be morally justified (if
any), the individual soldier ought to be enabled to have as clear an idea
ol w hat he can legitimately do to the enemy as he has of when he can
legitimately turn his back on the enemy."
Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Hare believes the nature of war is so
unpredictable that military educators cannot prepare soldiers for every possible scenario
they might encounter The North Vietnamese military practiced forms of military
tactics that the l Jmted States soldiers had never encountered betore This made it
difficult to handle new situations for which there was no standard protocol to follow
Rules of engagement were developed while the war was in progress. To say these rules
were general or universal may have been difficult to determine since there was no
rule of measure.
Difficulty with Moral Thinking
I lare finds one difficulty with moral thinking has to deal with the problem of
incurring "consequences which run counter to the intuitions of the ordinary man
”
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I his dill, cults is critical to Hare's two-level approach to moral thinking since the
thinking man's domain may be limited to the lower level Both Nagel and Brandt have
dealt with this problem: one more successfully than the other according to Hare Nagel
seems to use the "intuitions of the ordinary man" as a means to show the weakness that
can be found in utilitarianism and its associated theories. Hare sees that Nagel can
"think up cases in which a utilitarian calculation would seem to justify actions contrary
to principles which most of us, at least when we are not philosophizing, hold sacred."”
When one looks at these cases, they may turn up to be either based upon weak
utilitarian computations or unlikely to ever occur Hare notes Nagel’s view of this
when Nagel "refers to the abyss of utilitarian apologetics.’ and a utilitarian can readily
admit that it is possible by a too superficial or facile application of utilitarian arguments
to justify courses of action which a more thoroughgoing utilitarianism would
condemn Nagel's theories suggest that he believes the practice of utilitarianism is
maintained at a higher level beyond what an ordinary person is capable of performing.
Flare sees this concern as a reason why many indiv iduals are turned off to utilitarianism.
for Hare, Brandt s '"two-level" approach to utilitarianism offers a way to
counter assaults of theories such as Nagel's. Hare states:
1 he 'sacred principles' of the ordinary man. and the rules of war which
are a crude attempt to apply them to a particular practical sphere, have
an established place in any complete utilitarian theory: unfortunately
utilitarians have not sufficiently emphasized this, and therefore
"absolutists have some excuse for ignoring it.
^
1 he "sacred principles" could be interpreted as being equivalent to the non-overriding
principles Hare advocates using in critical reasoning. Hare notes that the notion of
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established place has caused some perplexity since both utilitarianism and absolutism
ha\ e failed to clarify it He thinks the best "name'' for it is what Ross called “prima
lacie 1 1 a re thinks Nagel would have been more successful in his paper if he had
avoided using the terminology "absolutist” and chosen to focus his view on a
deontologist theory However, Hare accepts that there is a deficiency in
deontological theories in that "they have no coherent rational account to give of any
level of moral thought above that of the man who knows some good simple moral
principles and sticks to them This individual is simply abiding by what he believes
it is his duty to perform which is following "good simple moral principles at the
intuitive level 1 he problem occurs, for Hare, when philosophers put more thought into
a decision than this particular individual is capable of performing Hare believes that,
on a critical level, philosophers "will be able to give account, either of how we are to
come by these admirable principles, or of what we are to do when they conflict "" To
try to accomplish such an account, he holds it as necessary to embrace his "two-level”
approach to moral thinking as a means to accepting principles.
Theoretical f oundation for Moral Thinking About War
The goal of 1 lare's paper has been to try to convince us that a "sound theoretical
foundation can in principle be provided for moral thinking about war Brandt's
version of contractual rule-utilitarianism has been successful at accomplishing this
according to Hare, whereas Nagel's move to "absolutism" falls short Hare believes
humanity has come a long way in securing "an improvement in our present customs,
either by new international conventions or simply by the preservation and spread of
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righl attitudes in soldiers and their commanders and governments”5’ Of course,
technology has led to new weapons and methods of tilling, hut Hare understands that it
IS possible to control thetr use through what he calls “rational procedures
”60
amongst
the players. 1 his would include deliberation at the critical level in developing universal
prescriptions that would produce the best results for all involved:
1 his is asking a lot: but the history of such negotiations is not
exclusively a history of failure. In World War II poison gas was not.
after all. used, though many expected that it would be. In both the world
wars the Red Cross was for the most part respected Without some
background of w ritten or unwritten international convention, neither of
these restraints might have been exercised, and the conventions owed
more to rational thought than to emotion, even if the reasoning had more
ol prudence in it than of moral itv.
Regardless of the reasoning behind the decision of not using chemical munitions or
respecting the Red Cross, adherence to rules of war has saved an untold number of lives
throughout historv
Besides these advantages. Hare reaffirms his opinion that Brandt has succeeded
where Nagel has failed in attempting to justify the same tvpes of rules:
But whereas Brandt is able to tit these rules into a rational svstem which
also provides means lor their selection and justification, Nagel, w ho is
confined to one level of moral thinking, predictably finds himself tom
between utilitarian arguments and absolutist ones, and thinks that in
difficult cases he may be in ‘a moral blind alley,' in which 'there is no
honorable or moral course tor a man to take, no course free of guilt and
responsibility for evil.'
'"
Hare thinks this is a major defect in Nagel's theoiy
. The problem of "guilt" concerns
Hare for he thinks it is an inappropriate term to use to discuss these problems:
A man with good moral principles will be very likely tofed guilty
whatever he does in cases such as Nagel is speaking of If he did not. he
would not be such a good man For a person, on the other hand, who is
mainly concerned to avoid feelings of guilt, the best advice is to grow a
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thick skin
'
Hare also notes that it growing thick skin is unlikely, another means available is to
adopt a set of absolutist principles that would conform to his actions thereby freeing
him of any ‘guilt' that may have been caused by the consequences of his actions. Do
we simply “take a moral holiday" ' and disregard what is done '1 Hare has to agree with
Nagel in that “it is incoherent to suggest that one might 'sacrifice one's moral integrity
justifiably, in the serv ice of a sufficiently worthy end,' it is not incoherent to suggest
that one might so sacrifice one's peace of mind ',f’5 He believes this may be brought
about by the perplexity between moral integrity and peace of mind if "one equates
having sinned with having a sense of having sinned"' " Because of this. Hare offers a
suggested justification for one attraction to absolutism:
If. say. we are theists and can convince ourselves that God has laid down
some relatively simple rules and that by observing these we can keep
ourselves unspotted and safe from hellfire, this may seem a aood way of
avoiding the agony of mind which comes, in difficult cases, from
calculation of the consequences of alternative actions.'
Hare gives Nagel some credibility for dodging this sort of hypocrisy: “for he remains
enough of a utilitarian to see that the implications of consistent absolutism are
unacceptable He thinks this is how Nagel leads himself into his own “moral blind
alley." flare develops a way out of the alley which is:
to treat the general principles of the absolutist as indispensable
practical guides, but not as epistemologically sacrosanct, and to admit a
level of thought at which they can be criticized, justified, or even on
occasion rejected in their particular applications when conflicts arise or
when a case is sufficiently out of the ordinary to call for special
consideration.
,v
This shows the problem Nagel encounters when he attempts to give Ins principles a
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greater position than they should hold. He gets himself locked on one level which leads
to conflicts between his absolutist and utilitarian positions. To get out of this alley.
Hare s two-level approach offers the notion of putting the principles aside if necessary
and focusing on the situation. If it is a case "sufficiently out of the ordinary,” the
principles may not help and critical thinking becomes absolutely necessary. Hare
interprets another problem in Nagel's theory indeterminacy. Hare claims Nagel uses a
general principle to discuss the need to focus on individuals as subjects to classify and
maintain his insight Hare finds it hard to accept this sort of principle as being realistic
due to its ambiguity and uncertainly
Hare notes that "we have grown accustomed to moral philosophers telling us
that we can ascertain our duties to other people by appeal to an a priori principle that
we ought to treat people as people. I his view is extremely adaptive and Nauel's is
just another version of this technique Hare sees Nagel as failing to present the idea that
one max be able to treat individuals as individuals by detesting them as well as showing
admiration toward them. 1 hus. the easiest way to implement Nagel's notion of
"manifesting an attitude to them" would be to hate them If we do this "then we can
manifest this attitude by any barbarity that takes our fancy, in the assurance that we are
not doing what Nagel's principle forbids" : Hare views this as a useful means to
safeguard what Nagel suggests as the “maintenance of a direct interpersonal response to
the people one deals with"
After the negative interpretation of Nagel's "War and Massacre" Hare states
that he has "probably got Nagel all wrong.” ' He thinks Brandt's rendition is more
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generous in that perhaps Nagel's "absolutism" would serve better if moral judgments
were “universalizable ” In other words, we should
^
think of those affected by our actions, including the enemy, as people
ike ourselves, and do to them only what is permitted by a set of
universal principles that we are prepared to see adopted for cases in
which we are at the receiving end. 74
1 his may be a version of "do unto others, as you would have done unto you." The
question arises to how far are we willing to uo with this^
I lare s interpretation of Nagel and Brandt gives new insight to the development
ot the rules ol war 1 he United States Army has taken steps to develop its values as a
means to guide the actions of soldiers This can be seen as encompassing the first level
oi moral thinking that Hare advocates The seven Army values were designed for the
ordinary soldier because the Army saw the need for a "rock-solid ethical base"75 for
decision making. Because military decision making is so critical at times, there was
the.
need to develop and maintain strong individual and professional
values because decisions frequently involve tough ethical choices. They
are not merely cases of mechanical application of academic principles or
bureaucratic policies. These choices may bring forth dilemmas of
conscience and foster strong feelings.
7f '
I his problem oi conflicting values was recognized, yet there is little guidance on how
to determine what choices to make. The critical level of moral thinking that Hare offers
perhaps could be a useful tool
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CHAPTER 5
MORAL MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS
My intention in this chapter is to discuss whether absolutist or utilitarian
guidelines are sufficient to guide the decision making process for the conduct of
mdi\ 'duals under the rules of war This is the basic discussion I will focus on using the
principles set forth by Nagel. Brandt, and Hare. I propose to demonstrate that there is a
weakness in the theories when examined individually but together may offer a viable
method for educating military personnel in moral decision making. I will review one
case in which a difficult decision must be made
Prisoner Problem
1 he case I would like to consider is what I refer to as the prisoner problem. To
set up the case 1 present a scenario of a combat situation that presents the leader with
the need to make a moral choice among alternative actions. The situation is the
following: a small force is ordered to conduct a critical mission behind enemy lines
when during the mission they encounter enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner by the
small force:
1 he success of the small force in carrvmg out its mission will allow the
seizure of a major transportation centre w ithout a significant battle
which would affect a sizable civilian population If the battle does not
occur, many combatants and noncombatant casualties will be avoided as
well as extensive destruction of civilian property The force carrymg out
the mission, however, takes several wounded enemy soldiers prisoner
The mission is such that accomplishment is not possible if the force
keeps its prisoners in custody If the prisoners are released, it is highly
likely that the force will be compromised and that the mission will fail.
Under the circumstances, the commander of the force must decide
whether to kill the prisoners and whether such execution can be
justified
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I his case sets up various alternatives for the leader (call him CPT C) to choose to
perform 1 he most probable alternatives can be viewed as the following: 2
al Kill prisoners, continue mission, seize transportation centre
a2 Release prisoners, continue mission which is compromised and thus fail
a - ^eeP prisoners, continue mission, soldiers die and mission fails
a4 Keep prisoners, cancel mission, soldiers survive.
Nagel's Method
1 o guide his decision, CPT C may find absolutist principles useful in choosing
an alternative to handle the prisoners. To examine this scenario. I offer Nauel's
absolutist view on what actions should be taken toward "legitimate targets of
host' I itx I he status of the enemy soldiers changes once they are wounded and taken
prisoner I hex are no longer armed enemies and thus take on the status of
noncombatant Nagel would consider these prisoners "innocent” beinus because they
oiler no immediate threat to the friendly force The status of "innocent” beings could
saxe the prisoners from execution under the absolutist principle "Nexer kill innocent
human beings. An absolutist argument can be set up in the following manner
1 It is always wrong to kill innocent human beings.
2 Prisoners of war are innocent human beings
3. I herelore. it is always xxrong to kill prisoners of war
Under this argument. CPT C must choose to perform (a2), (a3) or (a4), since (al ) would
include killing the prisoners and violating the guidelines of absolutism. Nagel's
absolutism, however, offers little guidance for choosing between (a2), (a3) and (a4)
since the absolutist must "focus on actions rather than outcomes Phe consequences
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and results irom the actions are not a matter of concern for this theory since absolutism
is concerned with what someone is doing and not with what will happen. Nagel notes
that the "conflict between them arises because the alternatives we face are rarely
choices between total outcomes: they are also choices between alternative pathways or
measures to be taken 1 his theory could save the prisoners from execution, but it still
docs not give CPT C clear guidance on what other alternative action to choose At this
point, Nagel may direct CPT C to use absolutism in combination with a form of
utilitarianism C P I C should focus on the alternative that does not violate absolutist
principles, such as killing innocent persons, but also maximizes utility Absolutism. by
itself, max fall short, but some sort of combination of absolutism and utilitarianism
might be more successful.
Brandt's Method
As the leader of this small force. CPT C knows he must make a decision that
will bring about various consequences for himself as well as many others. With no
formal education on the laws of war, CPT C does remember that his military
identification card categorizes him in a Geneva Convention Class if he is ever taken
prisoner of war I his classification was designed to safeguard and protect prisoners of
war during hostile actions. So where does CPT C’s obligation lie9 To himself, his
soldiers, his orders, or his prisoners? To clarify these obligations, he understands that
he owes it to himself to maintain his personal integrity by doing the legal act He owes
loyalty to his soldiers, for as their leader, his decisions will affect their lives. CPT C
also has a duty to obey the lawful orders of his superiors w hich leads him to understand
9S
the seizure of the transportation centre as a critical mission. His final obligation is to
respect the sanctity of innocent lives and safeguard the prisoners. So how does CPT C
decide to act? Brandt suggests that “sound moral principles”6 or values would serve as
a guide to ensure the correct act is chosen. This is essentially referring to the need to
concern oneself with the intuitive level of moral thinking. The sound moral “values”
that CPT C faces include integrity, loyalty, duty and respect. An appeal to these values
would not help CPT C to determine which alternative to perform. To illustrate this:
al
. violates integrity and obligation to obey rules of war and respect of the
prisoners.
a2 and a3. violates the loyalty to his soldiers and duty to complete the mission.
a4: violates the duty to complete the mission.
The conflicts of these values sets up problems for rules of war. The Army values were
developed as a quick reference guide for conduct, but they do not offer guidance when
conflicts such as we have arise.
Brandt and Hare believe utilitarianism may offer more guidance. My first
analysis of the prisoner problem under utilitarian considerations is from the hedonic
act-utilitarianism (HAU) method. IfCPT C was not educated in the laws of warfare
and was a utilitarian, perhaps he would use HAU to guide his actions. HAU could offer
the same four alternatives with the following hedonic values:
Continue Mission + 1000
Seize transportation centre +2000
Avoid battle and save numerous +2000
lives
Friendly force survives + 500
Kill enemy prisoners -500
+5000 hedonic value
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Continue Mission + 1000
Mission fails
-2000
Battle results with numerous
-2000
casualties
Friendly force dies
-500
Release prisoners + 1000
-2500
Continue Mission + 1000
Mission fails
-2000
Battle results with numerous
-2000
casualties
Friendly force dies
-500
Keep prisoners +500
-3000
Cancel Mission
-1000
Battle results with numerous
-2000
casualties
Friendly force survives +500
Keep prisoners +500
-2000
If the alternative action is chosen by CPT C through HAU considerations, the only
choice would be (al) since it maximizes hedonic utility. The best answer is to kill the
prisoners, which is in complete opposition to absolutism, since in the long run this
action will cause considerably less suffering than allowing them to live:
Unless we assume some condition such that the warring party to which
the capturing force belongs would inevitably lose the war and that
capturing the transportation centre would only prolong the war with the
result of increased suffering, the logical action under [the humanitarian
principle of human suffering ought to be minimized] will be to execute
the prisoners and carry on with the mission. 7
This line of reasoning shows that HAU yields the conclusion, in this case, that CPT C
must select (al ). The problem with this choice is that it is not morally sound. The
concern is with the act of killing the prisoners involved in (al). A conflict may arise in
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Cl' U in Which his morals as a human being may question his utilitarian reasoning.
Morally he cannot bring himself to kill the prisoners knowing they are innocent victims.
I hus, the argument against HAU may be the following:
1 11 1S true
r
^en CPT C must choose to perform (al
)
2 It is not the case that CPT C must choose to perform (al ).
3 Therefore. HAU is false.
I his argument illustrates the point that HAU does not offer the guidance to make the
morally correct choice since it directs one to choose an act with morally objectionable
consequences. Perhaps some other form of utilitarianism would provide the basis for a
more successful decision-making process.
Brandt suggests that focusing on rule-utilitarianism may be a helpful guide to
military conduct. Brandt s contractual rule-utilitarian theory focuses on prescribing a
set ol rules that would maximize long-range expectable utility and are chosen by
rational, impartial persons who believed thev may be at war at some time. According to
rules guiding the conduct of warfare, which alternative should CPT C perform 9 He
knows his decision is critical for many reasons. He has received and must obey the
law ful order to seize the transportation centre in order for the mission to succeed His
soldiers depend upon him and will follow whatever decision he makes. To guide his
decision. CP I C must determine which universal rules would maximize expectable
utility
As indicated in the previous chapter. Huntington argued that there exists a need
for soldiers to obey the legal orders of their superiors. The requirement to obey law ful
orders is inculcated in soldiers when they begin their military training Huntington
101
belie\cd that it is of utmost importance to the military profession and therefore a rule of
conduct:
l or the [military] profession to performs its function, each level within it
must be able to command the instantaneous and loyal obedience of
subordinate levels. Consequently, loyalty and obedience are the highest
military \ irtues. the rule oi obedience is simply the expression of that
one among the military virtues upon which all the others depend.’ 8
According to Huntington's argument for the obedience of soldiers, it may be interpreted
that there is a fundamental rule to obey lawful orders which outweighs all other rules of
conduct If Huntington's rule maximizes expectable utility, CPT C must decide to
choose (al ). not because it maximizes utility (as HAU would require), but because.
according to rule-utilitarianism, his act is in accordance with the prescribed rule which
would produce the most utility According to this reasoning. CPT C could be morally
right in his action because he is obeying the rule requiring him to obe\ all lawful orders
If this line of reasoning is sound, then CPT C must choose (al
)
which will fulfill the
duty to obey orders and secure his loy alty to the surv ival of his soldiers But is this
action justified'’ One ol the problems with employing a rule-uti 1 itarian argument for
dutv to obeying orders is that it may absolve soldiers from being morallv responsible for
their actions. Hare notes the following;
1 he thesis is sometimes maintained that a soldier's duty is always to
obey orders: and this is often brought forward as a defense when
someone is accused of having committed some atrocity. It is said that,
since it is a soldier's duty to obey his orders, and he is liable to blame if
he disobeys them, we cannot consistently also blame him if in a
particular case he obeys them - even though the act which he has
committed is of itself wrong. We may blame his superiors who gave the
orders, but not the man who carried them out '
The other side of the argument maintains that individuals should always be responsible
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tor their own actions tor more often than not they could have done otherwise.
C hristopher believes that "while we might accept the claim that soldiers should
generally obey superior orders, numerous examples of abuses, some with catastrophic
consequences, clearly demonstrate that there cannot be a universal prescription that all
orders must always be obeyed." He offers an example to illustrate this:
( )ne need only recall the defense of war criminals such as Adolf
Lichmann. 1 could feel that the guilt was not mine, since
. the men at
the top. the elite, the popes of the empire, laid down the laws. And I? 1
had only to obey.'
. Such examples makes Huntington’s rule
utilitarianism justification for obedience indefensible.
I his illustration shows the need to question the extent to which orders are followed
Obeying orders may not always maximize utility Thus, even though the order to seize
the transportation centre is lawful, there are other circumstances that need to be
addressed, such as the fact that killing the prisoners violates other rules of conduct
As 1 indicated earlier, there are international and national guidelines developed
to control the conduct of war These international laws, or rules of conduct for war.
were dev eloped according to Brandt s requirements 1 he laws were designed by
mdiv iduals under a "veil of ignorance" since they did not know if thev would ever be at
war with one another They were intended to bring about the most good for those
indiv iduals it ever involved in hostile conflicts. I hese rules were also designed as a
means to help guide military decisions. According to these rules of war. (al
)
is an
unauthorized act since is involves killing (or essentially murdering) the prisoners of
war The need to comply with rules governing obedience to orders is now in conflict
w ith the need to obey the rules of war governing the treatment of prisoners. Which set
01' rules maximizes utility? To solve this dilemma, one may invoke the notion of
military necessity which may override the rules. According to international law.
military necessity ” establishes a:
sufficient reason tor performing actions "indispensable' to subduine the
enemy as quickly as possible, but which would otherwise be prohibited
This effectively prohibits violence not done for military purposes, but
permits almost anything done for military objectives.
I Ins definition is somewhat vague since it is open to diverse interpretations. It is
generally used for addressing "the tension inherent in attempting to minimize suffering
through rules, while at the same time employing a method (violence) that necessarilv
causes the suflermg of innocent people How does one know when to limit the use
of military necessity ’ Does this idea give soldiers a method of excuse for extreme
actions I chord raylor offers his view on how to handle a situation such as the
prisoner problem through use of military necessitv
1 hese requirements [the laws of war| are followed more often than not.
and for that reason millions are alive today who would otherwise be
dead But they are not infrequently violated, the rules read like absolute
requirements, but circumstances arise where military necessity, or even
something less, cause them to be disregarded. In the heat of combat,
soldiers who are frightened, angered, shocked at the death of comrades,
and fearful of treacherous attacks by enemies feigning death or
surrender, are often prone to kill rather than capture. Small
detachments on special missions
. may take prisoners under such
circumstances that men cannot be spared to guard them or take them to
the rear, and that to take them along would greatly endanger the success
of the mission or the safety of the unit. The prisoners will be killed, by
operation of the principles of military necessity
,
and no military or other
court has been called upon, so far as I am aware, to declare such killing a
war crime.
14
1 his explanation offers one possible reason for placing aside rules of war that has been
used to absolve individuals from wrong doing: mission success. Tay lor's "necessity of
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success principle may have the following interpretation:
MN: An action is justified by military necessity if it will contribute
significantly to the success of the mission. 15
1 his interpretation could be insinuating military necessity as possibly prevailing over
the rules of war It is known that rules of war have been violated throughout histoiy and
will probably continue to be violated in the future. Regardless, they are still useful to
ensure military actions do not get out of hand Taylor states that “violated or ignored as
they 0<Ien are, enough of the rules are observ ed enough of the time so that mankind is
very much better off with them than w ithout them." 16
Brandt incorporates the notion of “necessity" in his theorv when he suuuests
1 he rules of war, then, subject to the restriction that the rules of war may
not prevent a belligerent from using all the power necessary’ to overcome
the enemy, will be ones whose authorization will serve to maximize
welfare. This restriction, incidentally, itself manifests utilitarian
considerations, for a nation is limited to the use of means necessary to
overcome an opponent. Clearly it is contrary to the general utility that
anv amount or manner of force be emploved when it is no
I
necessary for
victory
1 his essentially brings another rule into play which requires an extreme act to be within
the guidelines of military necessity Brandt is suggesting that invoking “necessity " in
itself is v iewed as a utilitarian method since one uses it to bring about a greater good
through its use For example, using Taylor’s explanation, it is allowable to kill the
prisoners because killing the prisoners under the guidelines of "military necessitv
”
would bring about the greater good In CPT C's situation, does this view warrant
killing the prisoners'7 When a conflict among rules exists it becomes more difficult to
decide which act to perform as well as difficult to decide which rule is among the set
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that maximizes expectable utility CPT C should choose the rule .ha, produces the most
utility as compared to other rules For example, CPT C faces the following conflicting
rules:
R1 If you are in a combat situation where a conflict of values arises and
must decide how to act then you must not commit any war
crimes.
R2 If you are in a combat situation where a conflict of values arises and
must decide how to act then you must obey all lawful orders
R3 If you are in a combat situation where a conflict of values arises and
must decide how to act then you must perform the act if it is a
military necessity.
( R 1 ) and ( R3 ) may be perceived as contradictory making the case more difficult What
are the consequences of adopting these rules as a guide to decide what action to
perform ’ Brandt argues that we should choose the rule that maximizes expectable
utilih I he correct act to choose would be the act that is compatible with the best rules
which would in tact maximize expectable utility The right act to perform in wartime
w ould be the act that conforms to the correct set of international rules-the set that
would have been chosen i! rational persons behind a v eil of ignorance had chosen rules
for the conduct of w ar in which they might be engaged Brandt thinks that such
individuals would choose rules that they believe to be utilitv maximizing. The
difficulty arises in deciding which rules would maximize expectable utility on an
international level in times of war International rules would be essentially useless if
there were no way to secure their acceptance by those who would be expected to abide
bv them if ever faced with participating in war This is why Brandt suggests the needed
requirement of authoritative status for these rules. Is it possible to develop and enforce
such international laws? I his extreme interpretation of the authoritative set of rules
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could lead to the contention that Brandt's rule-utilitarianism theory, as a guide for rules
of war. is implausible because of this difficulty. It could then be unsuitable to make
general rules be universally required or enforced Because of this, an argument against
Brandt s version of rule-utilitarianism can be the following
1 II Brandt s contractual rule-utilitarianism is sufficient for guidinu
rules of war, then one must choose to perform acts that are in
accordance with the international laws that were designed to
serve as utility-maximizing rules.
2 It is not the case that one must choose to perform acts that are in
accordance with the international laws that were designed to
serve as utility-maximizing rules.
I herefore, Brandt s contractual rule-utilitarianism is insufficient for
guiding rules of war
I remise (2) can be validated by appeal to the use of military necessity and inability to
enlorce international rules through authoritative measures. As a rule, military necessity
may override the set of rules that were designed to maximize utility making them
ineffective 1 lowever. the rules would still be valid since violation of the rules would
not destroy their legitimacy. 1 he second problem stems from the lack of an
authoritativ e body to enforce the rules. 7 he closest authoritative bod\ of control is the
l 'nited Nations that was designed as an international organization with the mission to
promote peace and international security as well as cooperation in the economic and
social field Because the world has such a diverse nature with different people,
different methods of governing, and diverse history, it becomes difficult to impose and
enforce international rules on such a world. Throughout history, new sets of
international laws on the conduct of war have had to be developed as new weapons and
methods of combat were developed Thus, the best set of rules may not always remain
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the best set of rules. If Brandt wants contractual rule-utilitarianism to guide the conduct
of war through acceptance of the best set of rules designed to maximize expectable
utility, I believe he needs more specification for guidance for when a conflict arises
between rules that exist in this set of best rules.
bach ol the proposed rules may maximize expectable utility depending upon
how one interprets the concept of “utility.” If CPT C followed an absolutist set of rules
that adhered to his belief in the sanctity of human life (R1 ) may bring about the most
expectable utility. I herefore, he could not choose to perform (at ). In another possible
world, CP I C ma\ believe the rules that maximize utility' encompassed the theor\ of
militaiy necessity, and he may not be concerned with the welfare of the prisoners. They
are the "enemy" to him regardless of their “innocent” status Why should he sacrifice
his men and numerous innocent civ ilians for the sake of these few individuals9 Under
these assumptions, (a 1 ) may be the best option through adherence to (R2) and (R3).
(R2) may stipulate the need to perform ( a 1 ) since it is the only action that could
guarantee the success of the mission and thus completing his order to seize the
transportation centre (R3) may also be interpreted as maximizing expectable utility
since the mission may be deemed an act of “military necessity” therebv requiring CPT
C to do “whatever it takes” to get the mission completed This may include having to
kill the prisoners to complete the mission. 1 hus, Brandt s contractual rule-utilitarian
theory fails to give adequate guidance to solve the prisoner problem and more
expansion on his theory is needed
Hare's Method
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I he difficulty of conflicting rules in conflicting worlds may lead CPT C to refer
to Hare s method of moral reasoning at the critical level Since CPT C has a conflict at
the intuitive level under the guidelines of rule-utilitarianism, he must now refer the
dilemma to the critical level under the guidelines of act-utilitarianism If he does refer
to this level by employing act-utilitarianism of the hedonic form, he will get the same
result as determined earlier in this chapter. The result will be the obligation to perform
(a
I
)
since it was the act that maximized utility. But this method was found to generate
objectionable results on the grounds that (al
)
involved killing “innocent” prisoners. To
avoid the complication of objectionable consequences from employing HAU, one may
interpret Hare s second level as a "specific rule-utilitarian" theory' as Jeffrey P
Whitman does 1 1 his interpretation can be understood in Hare’s definition of specific
rule-utilitarianism:
1 mean by specific rule-utilitarianism a type of rule-utilitarianism whose
rules (or principles, as 1 prefer to call them) are allowed to be of
unlimited specificity provided that they do not cease to be universal It
is thus the practical equivalence of [universalistic act-utilitarianism],
namely an act-utilitarianism which accepts the meta-ethical view that
moral judgments are universalizable. Positions [specific rule-
utilitarianism] and [universalistic act-utilitarianism] are practical 1\
equivalent, because [universalistic act-utilitarianism], in accepting
universalizability, admits that moral judgments made (on a utilitarian
basis) about individual acts commit their maker also to principles
applying to all precisely similar acts; and this is tantamount to accepting
specific rule-utilitarianism.'"
As previously stated. Hare's theories are interpreted as collapsing into one another. For
this reason, I will use this interpretation to help determine what decision should be
made in the prisoner problem to avoid the problems of HAU.
CPT C has determined that the intuitive level has not provided him adequate
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guidance to decide what action to perform. He must now move to the critical level. At
the critical level, it becomes necessary to “abandon all the unreflective responses that
are part ot our moral training and make decisions based only on what [Harej calls logic
and facts.”21 To begin this process, steps must be taken. The first step is to identify the
logical use of the words that will guide the action. This in itself is a two step process:
... the first step that the moral philosopher has to take, in order to help
us think better (i.e. more rationally) about moral questions, is to get to
understand the meanings of the words used in asking them; and the
second step, which follows directly from the first, is to give an account
of the logical properties of the words, and thus of the canons of rational
thinking about moral questions
.
22
for these steps, CPT C must determine the moral words that are causing the conflict
and the logical properties attached to those words. The second step is to determine the
facts that will affect the preferences of the individuals involved. These facts “Hare
believes should be taken into account when making moral decisions are those having to
do with the preferences of those people affected by the decision that will have to be
made/ " CPT C must decide in his situation which individuals will be affected by his
decisions. It is the preferences of these individuals that will factor into his decision
making process.
A better understanding of the first step is to understand the notion of “logic” that
Hare employs in his critical thinking. This “logical” interpretation of words has to do
with how we use words to denote their meaning for moral considerations. How we use
words in sentences helps to determine how we intend their meaning and logical
properties to be interpreted. With this understanding, CPT C must decide how to
interpret the values, which can be viewed as the moral words causing the conflict, that
1 10
he faces in regards to his moral intuitions As an example of how this process works.
Brandt offers an account of how to determine the moral and non-moral sense of terms
such as "duty":
ins helpful to begin with the modifier moral.’ What must we suppose
about a duty or obligation in order to speak properly of it as a ‘moral'
one ' ( 1 ) It must be a matter of conscience. That is, in part, failure to
perform will, unless there is adequate justification or excuse, arouse guilt
feelings in the agent and moral disapproval in observers, if they know
the lacts and are sensitive. (2) The requirement must command roughly
community-wide support, not merely that of some class or caste (3)
failure to perform, without excuse, will reflect on character-this being
spelled out by reference to traits like honesty, respect for the rights of
others, and so on (4) The requirement is not one just of prudence or
convenience, but a matter of principle. (5) The requirement must be
construed to have stringency superior to that of claims of manners,
custom, taste, law, and courtesy.
^
Brandt admits these conditions are somewhat vague and mav need additional
explanation to be supported However, the\ do give general guidance on how to
interpret the use of the logical properties of words.
Brandt s example of the moral definition of "dut\” can be used as one method
to help determine how C P I C should define his conflicting moral principles Brandt's
qualifications for determining the moral sense of words can be simplified in the
following manner
( 1 ) Matter of conscience
(2) Command community-wide support
(3 ) Failure to perform will reflect on character of individual
(4) Matter of principle
(5) Superior requirement
These criteria can be applied to the values CPT C faces in his conflict of alternative
actions. I le must decide where the utility of his values are ranked according to these
criteria. It is necessary to determine which act if performed would bring about the most
utility for the values in conflict. The adherence or violation of a value can bring about
various hedons and dolors to those involved in the situation. The values CPT C faces as
mentioned earlier are integrity, loyalty, duty and respect. This may not, however, be an
easy task since the values attributed to the alternative actions can all be construed as
matters of conscience that command community-wide support. They can also be
viewed as matters of principle and failure to perform them will reflect greatly upon
CPT C’s character. The one possible discriminating criterion may be the need to
determine which alternative action will generate the superior requirement of utility
from the conflicting values. The violation of a value will produce dolors and the
adherence to a value will produce hedons which will be experienced by CPT C. In this
case, CPT C s actions will result in him either violating or adhering to values that he
should hold as important to his character as an officer and a person. The utility derived
from the values adherence will determine the total utility for the act in regards to the
first step of Hare’s critical level of thinking requirements. Applying this method to the
example will yield the following results:
Act Value adherence Utility
Kill prisoners - respect -100
- integrity -100
Mission succeeds + duty + 100
Ensure safety of + loyalty + 100
soldiers 0
Release prisoners + respect + 100
+ integrity + 100
Mission fails - duty -100
Compromise safety - loyalty -100
of soldiers 0
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Keep prisoners + respect + 100
Mission fails
+ integrity + 100
- duty
-100
Compromise safety - loyalty
-100
of soldiers 0
Keep prisoners + respect + 100
+ integrity + 100
Mission fails - duty
-100
Secure safety of + loyalty + 100
soldiers +200
This calculation helps CPT C to determine that, according to the conflicting values he
faces, the best alternative to choose is (a4) since the values attribute to the
maximization of utility. 25
The second step needs to be examined to help support the result of the first step.
This step makes it necessary to examine how the alternative actions will affect the
preferences of the individuals involved. Because preferences can vary from one
individual to another, it is necessary to make assumptions about what kinds of
preferences individuals are likely to hold as sacred. For this reason, it must be
presumed that:
. . . most people must have a strong preference to live and that they
therefore have strong preferences for the means necessary for life, such
as food and shelter, and, further, they have the preferences for the secure
enjoyment of their lives. They do not want to live in fear of their lives or
in fear of being prevented from living as they wish. We will assume that
they assign a strong weight to these preferences, stronger than to other
preferences they may have. 26
This understanding may give rise to the belief that actions designed to maintain the
sanctity of life have a higher utility than those actions that may terminate life. Hare’s
requirement of universalizability requires CPT C to view the preferences of all parties
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to the action. He must then consider these preferences as if each were affecting him:
It is as though one person had many preferences about the outcome of a
particular situation and had to decide what to do based on his
consideration of all of them. The agent then makes a new preference
based on his reflection on the particular preferences of all the parties,
the choice made by the agent must be one he would be willing to accept
were he to be in the position of any of those significantly affected by his
choice. This does not imply that the preferences of all parties must be
satisfied equally. It does imply that the reasoning the agent uses in
making a decision must be comprehensible to all rational persons. Hare
would say that this is a requirement of moral reasoning itself. 27
According to this explanation, CPT C must calculate the utility of the individuals’
preferences involved in the actions. He must determine what utility would be produced
by viewing the preferences of those involved. The prisoners would more than likely
prefer life over death and would have a higher preference satisfaction by remaining
alive. However, their preference satisfaction value does not rank as high as CPT C’s or
his soldiers’ preferences. CPT C’s preferences are valued higher than the prisoners
since his concern for himself is higher than the concern for the prisoners. The
preferences for his soldiers rank the highest since CPT C is responsible for them and his
decisions will affect their preferences based on what action he chooses to perform.
With this determined, CPT C develops the following preference utility rating for the
four alternative actions:
28
Act Utility
-50
+ 100
+200
al: Kill prisoners
Save self
Save soldiers
+250
a2: Release prisoners +50
-100
-200
Compromise self
Compromise soldiers
-250
114
Keep prisoners +50
Compromise self
-100
Compromise soldiers
-200
-250
Keep prisoners +50
Save self + 100
Save soldiers +200
+350
The appeal to the preferences of the individuals involved results in the same conclusion
as the logical use of the values CPT C faces. CPT C must choose to perform (a4) since
it maximizes utility for both the logical moral words and facts required in Hare’s
theory. Thus, Hare s critical thinking theory offers a viable result based on the utility of
the logical moral words and preferences of the individuals.
However, Hare’s method of moral thinking may be viewed as a matter of
judgment. No two situations will ever be the same, but education and training on a
version of Hare’s theory may lead to a method that shows “what different sorts of moral
guidelines exist and how they function on the critical and/or intuitive level.”29
Moral Military Decision Making Process
Individually, absolutism and utilitarianism may offer ineffective support in
guiding the development and implementation of a moral military decision making
process as demonstrated in the prisoner problem. However, reformulating their use,
structured in a similar way to the military decision making process,30 may offer a viable
method to guide moral decision making for military personnel. The six step process
would be simple to learn and implement since it is adapted from a known and practiced
military doctrine.
31
The six steps to the moral military decision making process would
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be the following:
1
2
j.
4
5
6
.
Identify the moral decision to be made
Identify the alternative courses of action
Identify and apply absolutist screening criteria (if applicable).
dentify and apply the logical moral principles and facts
identify- and compare utility of (4)
Make decision.
I his process may not include all the applicable ethical theories that are available for
use. nor may it be applicable to every moral dilemma one may encounter. However.
,t
may offer some practical guidelines to move from an intuitive level of thinking to the
ciitical level of thinking thereby bringing about more informed decisions.
I his process will be better understood by relating the prisoner problem and
other examples to the six steps The first step is to identify what moral decision needs
to be made. This essentially occurs when the moral principles conflict at the intuitive
level requiring more reasoning through the critical level. The decision may be
necessary (or a harmless dilemma such as deciding whether or not to falsify documents
or as difficult as having to decide whether or not to take someone's life. Regardless of
the severity of the moral dilemma this process could still be applied
( )nce the moral dilemma is recognized the next step is the development of
alternate courses of action For the prisoner problem, there were four identified
alternate courses of action:
al Kill prisoners, continue mission, seize transportation centre
a2 Release prisoners, continue mission which is compromised and thus fail
ac Keep prisoners, continue mission, soldiers die and mission fails
a4 Keep prisoners, cancel mission, soldiers survive.
1 16
1 hese four alternatives were deemed as possible choices by CPT C given Ins required
mission and present situation CPT C's mission may have gone unhindered, but his
case has been complicated by the prisoners Thus, the actions were developed based
upon the orders from his superiors and the additional complication of captured
prisoners under his control
Step three requires the identification and application of any applicable
' absolutist screening criteriaT These criteria are developed from absolutist guidelines
uhich are those principles or rules that govern certain act-types as always wromz or
always obligatory at every time and every place no matter what the consequences
i hese criteria may be difficult to determine since the use of practices such as “military
necessity may override absolutist principles it deemed as a requirement to mission
success. I his in itself may be viewed as employing critical thinking. As Whitman
notes
Whenever one is considering employing the militarv necessity
qualification to an action, this automatically indicates a move from first
level moral deliberation (guided by general moral principles) to second
level moral deliberation (guided by specific rule utilitarianism). In
making moral decisions during w artime, this degree of flexibility is w hat
the war convention allows and what most soldiers and their leaders
expect and desire.
To support the moral military decision making process, absolutist guidelines should be
maintained along both the general war convention rules as well as general guidelines of
humanitarian concerns These guidelines would then “screen off any alternative
actions that would require violating an absolutist principle. Screening off an act would
be to remove the act from the list of possible courses of action. An absolutist screening
criterion lor military decision making could be the followimi:
SC 1 An individual should never commit any act that would involve the
intentional death of an innocent person
I his possible absolutist principle can be supported through articles of the Geneva
C onventions as well as United States military regulations that specify safeguarding
innocent persons. It is possible that "viewing the articles of the war convention in
absolutist terms is thought to further compliance, especially if accompanied with some
form ol punitive sanction With this understanding, CPT C can essentially “screen
oil alternative (al
)
since it involves committing an act that is in violation of an
absolutist principle, i his act could be construed as a war crime, and if performed,
could make CPI C susceptible to punishment. Since (al
)
is screened off by the
absolutist screening criterion, it is no longer an available option to CPT C He is now
required to choose between the remaining three options which are still in conflict with
one another
1 he prisoner problem offers a clear example of how an absolutist principle can
screen off and alternative act as no longer an available option. Not every dilemma will
have screening criteria that will be applicable to the situation I he example used in
C hapter 4 created a dilemma of whether or not to obey the commander s order to falsify
vehicle maintenance reports 4 here may not be any war conventions or humanitarian
laws concerned with maintaining vehicle maintenance records. In this case step three
would not be a concern and the procedure should be continued to the next step
The fourth step requires the identification and application of the logical moral
principles and facts relevant to the situation This is a two step process in itself The
first step can be exemplified by using Brandt’s five criteria for evaluating the logic of
moral words. These evaluation criteria can be useful for guiding the evaluation of
conflicting values at the critical level. Brandt’s five criteria are the following:
( 1 ) Matter of conscience
(2) Command community-wide support
(3) Failure to perform will reflect on character of individual.
(4) Matter of principle
(5) Superior requirement
The previous section of this chapter illustrated how these evaluation criteria for moral
words helped determine what act CPT C should perform regarding the conflict of his
values. All the conflicting values he faced met the first four evaluation criteria equally,
but were different when judged against the superior requirement criterion. CPT C had
to compare the remaining three acts which yielded the following results:
Act Value Adherence Utility
Release prisoners + respect + 100
+ integrity + 100
Mission fails - duty -100
Compromise safety - loyalty -100
of soldiers 0
Keep prisoners + respect + 100
+ integrity + 100
Mission fails - duty -100
Compromise safety - loyalty -100
of soldiers 0
Keep prisoners + respect + 100
+ integrity + 100
Mission fails - duty -100
Secure safety of + loyalty + 100
soldiers +200
Once the product of the moral words is determined, the next step is to determine the
facts relevant to the situation. This requires the review of preference satisfaction
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amongst the individuals involved. This step presented the following results:
Utility
Release prisoners +50
Compromise self
-100
Compromise soldiers
-200
-250
Keep prisoners +50
Compromise self
-100
Compromise soldiers
-200
-250
Keep prisoners +50
Save self + 100
Save soldiers +200
+350
This step offered the same result as determined from the moral words. With these
findings now determined, it becomes necessary to compare the results to determine the
act that maximizes utility.
The military decision making process compares the advantages and
disadvantages of the various courses of action. Step five of the moral military decision
making process uses a comparison of the utility determined from the moral words and
facts determined from the available courses of action. The following are the results:
Moral Words Facts Total Utility
a2: 0 -100 -100
a3: 0 -100 -100
a4: +200 +300 +500
The comparison clearly shows (a4) as the morally obligatory act because it maximizes
utility. Thus, the final step requires a decision to be made about what alternative action
to perform. CPT C must choose to perform (a4) which is to keep the prisoners and
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cancel the mission. This act will produce the most utility through the suggested
absolutist and utilitarian guidelines.
Vehicle Maintenance Report Case
This method worked for the prisoner problem but needs to be tested by another
example. I would like to complete the vehicle maintenance records case by applying
the moral military decision making process.
Step 1
.
I am ordered by a superior officer to falsify vehicle maintenance
records. Performing this act will in no way harm anyone nor disrupt the mission of the
unit. It would simply make my commander “look good” in the eyes of her superiors on
how vehicles are maintained in the unit. What she has asked me to do is to violate my
integrity in reporting the truth of vehicle maintenance status.
Step 2 : I am faced with two alternatives:
VMA1: Report false vehicle maintenance status.
VMA2: Report true vehicle maintenance status.
Step 3 : It was previously determined that there are no absolutist screening
criteria for this case. Therefore, the two alternatives must be evaluated at the next step.
Step 4 : Part 1 : The identified moral words that are in conflict are “duty” to my
commander and my own personal “integrity.” Applying Brandt’s criterion of moral
words yields the following utility factors:
VMA1 VMA2
( 1 ) Both values are a matter of conscience
(2) Duty to an unlawful order would not
0 0
command community wide support -100 + 100
(3) Maintaining integrity would uphold
an individual’s character -100 + 100
(4) Integrity is deemed a high matter
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of principle
_ 100 +100
(5) Both values are equal in requirement34 0 o
Total Utility Factor ~-300 +300
Part 2 requires the review of the preference facts that are attributed to those individuals
involved in the case. My personal preferences are deemed as having a higher
preference utility value than what my commander’s preferences would be in this case.
VMA 1 : Preference of commander + 1 00
Preference of self
-200
-100
VMA2: Preference of commander -100
Preference of self +200
+ 100
Step 5 : The next step is to compare the findings of Step 4:
Moral Words Facts Total Utility
VMA1: -300
-100 -400
VMA2: +300 +100 +400
Step 6 : Conducting a review of Step 5 clearly illustrates that the morally
obligatory act is VMA2 because it maximize total utility. Thus, I am morally obligated
to report true vehicle maintenance status regardless of what my commander orders.
Conclusion
This method may seem to be quite involved at first glance, but with training and
experience, the method could become an internalized evaluation system. The Army
values and general codes taught at the basic entry level to recruits are extremely useful
tools to introduce and instruct ethical standards to soldiers. As these soldiers rise in the
ranks, their leadership roles and levels of responsibility increase. While this process is
developed, these soldiers need to enhance their knowledge of these basic values and
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understand how to incorporate them into reasoning at the critical level. Through the
military educational system, this method could be incorporated into its academic
curriculum to help ensure the moral education of the military is nurtured and ultimately
maintained.
This method of critical thinking has not always been embraced by the military
for it has been viewed that ‘critical thinking is not always appropriate, yet decision
makers in combat cannot afford to spend valuable time thinking about whether to
think.’
35 To remedy this problem a method called a “quick test” has been developed to
determine whether or not critical thinking is appropriate:
. . . the quick test is used to decide rapidly and without excessive
overhead when to critique and improve an assessment and when to go
ahead and act on it. The quick test requires a balance among the costs of
delay, the costs of error if one acts without further critical thinking, and
the degree to which the situation is either unfamiliar or problematic
.
36
Through education and experience one can be able to use the quick test and the moral
military decision making process to make decisions. More experienced soldiers can
identify situations more easily than less experienced soldiers. As no two situations will
ever be exactly the same, exercise scenarios and situational training could be developed
to make individuals familiar with the moral military decision making process.
I have attempted to show that absolutist and utilitarian theories may not stand
alone for the development and implementation of rules guiding the conduct of war.
The noted weaknesses in Nagel’s and Brandt’s theories indicate that there may not exist
a perfect method for deciding how to act when a moral conflict arises. However, all
three authors contribute a portion to developing a possible decision making process for
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moral conflicts that I have suggested. As Hare indicates, absolutist principles are
indispensable practical guides”
' 7
that may lead us out of our moral blind alley which
helps my third step in the decision making process. Brandt’s suggested “sound moral
principles” are critical guiding factors in determining what values may conflict in our
actions which supports the fourth step in my process. Ultimately, it is Hare’s two-level
approach to moral thinking that guides the total process of learning to use critical
thinking.
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